基于系统动力学的众包创新平台接包方竞合悖论研究

Research on the Paradox of Competition and Cooperation among Task Acceptors in Crowdsourcing Innovation Platforms Based on System Dynamics

摘要: 众包创新作为一种企业充分利用外部群体智慧解决创新难题的新型商业模式，能有效降低创新风险、提升创新效率，目前已得到广泛应用。但实践中平台激励机制僵化、信任缺失、同质化竞争等问题影响了平台生态系统的可持续发展，亟待解决。为此，考虑到众包创新平台中接包方间的竞争与合作(竞合)关系呈现显著悖论特征。本研究基于系统动力学理论与方法，从众包创新平台接播放视角构建接包方竞合悖论的系统动力学模型，通过Vensim仿真揭示竞合悖论的动态演化机制。仿真结果表明：短期减少知识共享可提高接包方市场占有度与收益，但长期因知识老化、创新滞后与信任流失，其竞争优势衰退，最终导致接单量及市场份额下降，印证了过度竞争策略的不可持续性。研究提出需通过动态激励机制设计引导接包方在竞合间寻求平衡，以化解悖论对创新效率的负面影响，为平台管理者平衡接包方竞合关系提供决策参考。

Abstract: Crowdsourcing innovation, as a novel business model that enables enterprises to fully leverage the collective intelligence of external groups to solve innovation challenges, can effectively reduce innovation risks and enhance innovation efficiency, and has been widely adopted. However, in practice, issues such as rigid platform incentive mechanisms, lack of trust, and homogeneous competition have impacted the sustainable development of the platform ecosystem, necessitating urgent resolution. To this end, considering the significant paradoxical characteristics of the competition and cooperation (coopetition) relationships among task acceptors in crowdsourcing innovation platforms, this study, based on system dynamics theory and methodology, constructs a system dynamics model of the coopetition paradox from the perspective of task acceptors in crowdsourcing innovation platforms. Through Vensim simulation, the dynamic evolution mechanism of the coopetition paradox is revealed. The simulation results indicate that reducing knowledge sharing in the short term can increase the market share and profits of task acceptors, but in the long term, due to knowledge obsolescence, innovation lag, and loss of trust, their competitive advantage diminishes, ultimately leading to a decline in order volume and market share, confirming the unsustainability of excessive competition strategies. The study proposes the need to guide task acceptors to seek a balance between competition and cooperation through the design of dynamic incentive mechanisms, in order to mitigate the negative impact of the paradox on innovation efficiency, providing decision-making references for platform managers to balance the coopetition relationships among task acceptors.