算法推荐中的消费者信息弱势地位及其法律救济
The Vulnerable Position of Consumers in Algorithmic Recommendations and Legal Remedies
摘要: 在数字经济的浪潮下,算法推荐技术已广泛应用于电商平台。平台凭借数据垄断和算法黑箱的优势,使消费者陷入“信息茧房”,消费者面临“大数据杀熟”、知情权与选择权受损等问题。本文通过分析消费者信息弱势的成因,包括技术与资本驱动的数据垄断、算法操纵,以及由此导致的消费者在算法决策中的被动地位。同时,探讨现行法律体系在应对算法推荐挑战时的不足,如规则模糊、救济乏力、技术治理困境等。针对这些问题,提出“赋权 + 共治”的双向救济体系,旨在通过法律赋权和技术治理,平衡平台与消费者之间的信息不对称和权力失衡。具体措施包括细化算法解释权、引入数据可携带权、要求平台备案核心算法、实施动态监测、利用隐私计算技术优化模型,以及开发算法透明度工具等。强调多元共治的重要性,鼓励消费者参与维权、推动平台自律与政策激励相结合。
Abstract: Under the wave of digital economy, algorithmic recommendation technology has been widely used in e-commerce platforms. Relying on the advantages of data monopoly and algorithmic black box, the platform has made consumers fall into an “information cocoon”, and consumers are faced with problems such as “big data killing”, and the right to know and the right to choose are impaired. This paper analyzes the causes of consumer information weakness, including data monopoly driven by technology and capital, algorithmic manipulation, and the resulting passive position of consumers in algorithmic decision-making. At the same time, this paper discusses the shortcomings of the current legal system in coping with the challenges of algorithmic recommendation, such as vague rules, lack of relief, and technical governance dilemmas. In view of these problems, a two-way relief system of “empowerment + co-governance” is proposed, which aims to balance the information asymmetry and power imbalance between platforms and consumers through legal empowerment and technical governance. Specific measures include refining the right to interpret algorithms, introducing the right to data portability, requiring platforms to record core algorithms, implementing dynamic monitoring, using privacy-preserving computing technology to optimize models, and developing algorithm transparency tools. It emphasizes the importance of pluralistic co-governance, encourages consumers to participate in rights protection, and promotes the combination of platform self-discipline and policy incentives.
文章引用:刘瑜. 算法推荐中的消费者信息弱势地位及其法律救济[J]. 电子商务评论, 2025, 14(5): 3124-3129. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2025.1451625

参考文献

[1] 陈婉玲, 胡莹莹. 场景消费时代我国消费者保护法的功能拓展——从弱者倾斜保护到能力提升激励[J]. 浙江社会科学, 2022(10): 64-73.
[2] 张爱军. “算法利维坦”的风险及其规制[J]. 探索与争鸣, 2021(1): 95-102.
[3] 北京市市场监督管理局. 《网络交易平台经营者服务协议与交易规则、信息公示与披露、禁限售商品管理等系列合规指引的公告》[EB/OL].
https://scjgj.beijing.gov.cn/zwxx/2024zcwj/202502/t20250213_4009331.html, 2025-02-11.
[4] 陈珍妮. 欧盟《数字服务法案》探析及对我国的启示[J]. 知识产权, 2022(6): 110-126.
[5] 孙金云. 复旦教授打车800余次发现手机越贵打车越贵, 记者测试了一下[EB/OL].
https://www.163.com/dy/article/G485S6L90530SBFB.html, 2025-03-04.
[6] 腾讯新闻. 2024年南京法院新收涉消费者权益保护纠纷一审案件6662件, 同比下降1.77% [EB/OL].
https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20250314A08ILG00, 2025-03-04.
[7] 王昱颖, 张敏, 杨晶然, 等. 深度学习模型中的公平性研究[J]. 软件学报, 2023, 34(9): 4037-4055.
[8] 中央网络安全和信息化委员会办公室秘书局等四部门, 北京市网络舆情和举报中心. 关于开展“清朗·网络平台算法典型问题治理”专项行动的通知[EB/OL].
https://www.bjjubao.org.cn/2024-11/25/content_46395.html, 2024-11-25.
[9] 马治国, 占妮. 数字社会背景下超级平台私权力的法律规制[J]. 北京工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2023, 23(2): 115-131.
[10] 刘颖, 刘佳璇. 数字经济中黑暗模式的法律规制: 基本原理、域外方案与本土路径[J]. 上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2024, 26(5): 122-138.
[11] 何泽平, 许建, 戴华, 等. 联邦学习应用技术研究综述[J]. 信息网络安全, 2024(12): 1831-1844.
[12] 陈菲, 蒲文杰. 《数字市场法》: 欧盟规制数字“守门人”的制度路径[J]. 欧洲研究, 2024, 42(1): 23-56.
[13] 周靖人. 面向开放智能, 蚂蚁集团揭秘隐私计算框架[EB/OL].
https://m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_13867757, 2021-07-08.
[14] 吴泽南. 完善数字经济监管体系 规范算法定价秩序[EB/OL].
https://m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_30432553, 2025-03-18.
[15] 饿了么成立即时配送算法专家委员会 持续全局优化算法[EB/OL].
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1825898447823812397&wfr=spider&for=pc, 2025-03-06.