政府审计介入下非国有金融机构三方博弈的行为抑制机制与政策启示

Behavioral Inhibition Mechanisms and Policy Implications of the Tripartite Game of Non-State Financial Institutions under Government Audit Intervention

摘要: 为防止非国有金融机构与内部审计部门和社会审计机构的合谋、舞弊等行为。本文基于博弈理论，分析信息不对称条件下的非国有金融机构舞弊行为，构建三方收益矩阵模型，并计算其纳什均衡解，将政府审计作为变量，对比引入政府审计和未引入政府审计时的博弈过程，通过分析得出：政府审计机关能够有效遏制非国有金融机构的舞弊行为，降低内部审计部门和社会审计机构的合谋概率。

Abstract: In order to prevent non-state-owned financial institutions from collusion and fraud with internal audit departments and social audit institutions, this paper analyzes the fraudulent behavior of non-state-owned financial institutions under the condition of information asymmetry based on game theory, constructs the tripartite benefit matrix model, and calculates its Nash equilibrium solution, takes the government audit as a variable, and compares the game process between the introduction of the government audit and the introduction of the government audit, and through the analysis, it is concluded that: the government audit authority can effectively curb the fraudulent behavior of non-state financial institutions, and reduce the probability of collusion of the internal audit department and social audit institutions.