董事会断裂带对高管薪酬粘性的影响研究

Research on the Impact of Board Fault Zones on the Stickiness of Executive Compensation

摘要: 近年来，高级管理层的薪酬出现了“天价”和“高奖低罚”的趋势。本文基于社会认同理论，探讨董事会断裂带对高管薪酬粘性内在可能的影响方式和影响路径以及行业竞争度的调节作用，考察不同情况下董事会断裂带对高管薪酬粘性产生的影响并提出相关假设，最终以2013~2022年度沪深上市公司为研究样本，研究发现：1)董事会断裂带与高管薪酬粘性之间存在明显的正相关关系；2) 委托代理成本的增加是董事会断裂带对薪酬粘性的影响途径之一；3) 行业竞争压力减轻时，董事会断裂带对于高管薪酬粘性的影响会增强；4) 董事会断裂带对国有企业、内部控制质量较低企业的高管薪酬粘性影响更为显著。此外，相比于浅层断裂带，深层断裂带对高管薪酬粘性的影响更大。研究表明，董事会断裂带通过削弱监督职能加剧了高管薪酬粘性。基于此，本文提出了企业和监管机构两方面的对策建议，有助于提高董事会的决策效率和监督职能，减少高管薪酬粘性现象的发生。

Abstract: In recent years, executive compensation at the senior management level has exhibited a trend of “sky-high pay” and “high rewards with low penalties”. Based on social identity theory, this paper explores the potential influence mechanisms and pathways through which board fault lines affect the stickiness of executive compensation, as well as the moderating role of industry competitiveness. The study examines the impact of board fault lines on executive compensation stickiness under different conditions and proposes related hypotheses. Using a sample of listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2013 to 2022, the research findings indicate: 1) There is a significant positive correlation between board fault lines and executive compensation stickiness; 2) The increase in agency costs is one of the pathways through which board fault lines influence compensation stickiness; 3) When industry competitive pressure is reduced, the impact of board fault lines on executive compensation stickiness becomes stronger; 4) The influence of board fault lines on executive compensation stickiness is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises and companies with lower internal control quality. Furthermore, deep-level fault lines have a greater impact on executive compensation stickiness compared to shallow-level fault lines. The study suggests that board fault lines exacerbate executive compensation stickiness by weakening supervisory functions. Based on these findings, this paper proposes countermeasures for both enterprises and regulatory agencies, which can help enhance the decision-making efficiency and supervisory functions of boards, thereby reducing the occurrence of executive compensation stickiness.