论撤回公诉制度的实践偏差与体系重构——基于起诉便宜主义的分析视角

On the Practical Deviations and System Reconstruction of the Withdrawal of Public Prosecution System—An Analytical Perspective Based on Prosecutorial Discretion

摘要: 撤回公诉制度是我国刑事诉讼中检察机关纠正错误起诉的重要机制，但现行制度存在理论基础不清、功能定位偏差等问题。本文基于起诉便宜主义理论，通过比较法分析指出，完整的撤回公诉制度应当包含起诉裁量权、诉讼经济原则和程序控制机制三个核心要素。当前我国撤回公诉制度偏离这一理论框架，导致功能单一化、司法资源浪费和当事人救济不足等问题。为此，本文提出三方面完善路径：一是合理扩张撤回公诉事由，在审判阶段出现新事实或量刑情节时赋予检察机关裁量权；二是通过明确证据标准限制重新起诉，防止“程序空转”；三是构建分阶段的当事人救济机制，强化程序参与和权利保障。这些改革措施旨在实现撤回公诉制度的纠错功能和案件分流功能的有机统一，平衡诉讼效率与司法公正的价值目标。

Abstract: The system of withdrawing public prosecutions is an important mechanism for the prosecution authorities to correct erroneous prosecutions in China’s criminal litigation. However, the current system faces issues such as unclear theoretical foundations and deviations in functional positioning. Based on the theory of prosecutorial economy, this article points out through comparative legal analysis that a complete system for withdrawing public prosecutions should include three core elements: prosecutorial discretion, principles of litigation economy, and procedural control mechanisms. Currently, China’s system for withdrawing public prosecutions deviates from this theoretical framework, leading to issues such as singular functionality, waste of judicial resources, and insufficient relief for the parties involved. To address this, the article proposes three ways to improve: first, to reasonably expand the grounds for withdrawing public prosecutions by granting prosecutors discretion when new facts or sentencing circumstances arise at the trial stage; second, to clarify evidentiary standards to limit retrials and prevent “procedural stagnation”; and third, to establish a phased mechanism for party relief to enhance procedural participation and rights protection. These reform measures aim to achieve an organic unity between the corrective function of the withdrawal system and the function of case diversion, balancing the value objectives of litigation efficiency and judicial fairness.