先验自我的伦理使命：胡塞尔现象学中的责任观

The Ethical Vocation of the Transcendental Ego: The Concept of Responsibility in Husserlian Phenomenology

摘要: 本文以胡塞尔现象学的“先验自我”为核心，探讨其在伦理责任中的奠基作用及其内在困境。胡塞尔通过先验还原确立先验自我为意义建构的终极主体，将责任归结为自我对构造世界的绝对承担。然而此一理论进路因其唯我论倾向而面临挑战：他者被弱化为“另一个自我”，责任也成为封闭的自我独白，难以回应他者的异质性需求，因而未彻底突破先验哲学的自我主义界限。

Abstract: This paper centers on Husserl’s concept of the transcendental ego within phenomenology, examining its foundational role in ethical responsibility as well as its inherent limitations. Through the method of transcendental reduction, Husserl posits the transcendental ego as the ultimate subject of meaning-constitution, thereby grounding responsibility in the ego’s absolute accountability for the construction of the world. However, this theoretical approach encounters significant challenges due to its solipsistic tendencies: the other is reduced to a mere “alter ego”, and responsibility is confined to a self-enclosed monologue, thereby failing to adequately address the alterity and demands of the other. As such, Husserl’s framework does not fully transcend the ego-centric boundaries of transcendental philosophy.