电商平台金融垄断行为与监管对策研究
Research on Financial Monopoly Behavior and Regulatory Countermeasures of E-Commerce Platforms
摘要: 本文以电商平台金融垄断行为为研究对象,聚焦支付排他、信用捆绑及数据权力滥用三大典型垄断行为,结合阿里巴巴“二选一”案与欧盟《数字市场法》的比较分析,揭示其形成机制与竞争损害。研究发现,电商平台通过构建“支付–数据–信贷”正反馈循环强化市场支配地位,导致微观层面消费者福利减损、中观层面市场结构固化及宏观层面系统性金融风险。现行监管面临管辖权割裂、工具滞后与国际协作不足三重困境。基于此,本文提出四维监管对策:完善法律规制体系,增设数字金融垄断专章;建立智慧监管机制,整合多部门职能与技术工具;推动央行数字货币等技术治理创新;强化G20框架下的国际协同。研究为平台经济反垄断提供了金融维度的分析框架,对完善数字时代竞争政策具有理论与实践意义。
Abstract: This article takes the financial monopoly behavior of e-commerce platforms as the research object, focusing on three typical monopoly behaviors: payment exclusivity, credit bundling, and abuse of data power. By combining the comparative analysis of Alibaba’s “Choose One from Two” case and the EU’s “Digital Market Law”, it reveals the formation mechanism and competition damage. Research has found that e-commerce platforms strengthen their market dominance by constructing a positive feedback loop of “payment-data-credit”, leading to a reduction in consumer welfare at the micro level, solidification of market structure at the meso level, and systemic financial risks at the macro level. The current regulation faces three challenges: fragmented jurisdiction, outdated tools, and insufficient international cooperation. Based on this, this article proposes four-dimensional regulatory measures: Improving the legal regulatory system and adding a special chapter on digital finance monopoly; Establishing a smart regulatory mechanism and integrating multiple departmental functions and technical tools; Promoting technological governance innovation such as central bank digital currency; Strengthening international collaboration within the G20 framework. The research provides a financial analysis framework for anti-monopoly in the platform economy, which has theoretical and practical significance for improving competition policies in the digital age.
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