区块链驱动下中小企业融资与隐私数据披露的三方博弈研究

Research on the Tripartite Game of Blockchain-Driven SME Financing and Privacy Data Disclosure

摘要: 针对中小企业区块链融资效率提升和隐私保护之间的矛盾，本文创新性地搭建了政府、第三方平台与中小企业的三方静态博弈模型，以此来揭示隐私披露的决策机制。研究显示，当政府严格监管所产生的公信力净收益$R_g-C_g$ 大于补贴总额$S_p+S_e$ 、平台技术收益的增量$R_p$ 高于成本增量$C_p$ 、且企业融资成本的节约$D_e$ 超过隐私风险损失$C_e$ 时，存在纯策略纳什均衡，即政府严格监管、平台进行技术上链、企业披露数据并且守信。此方法借助收益矩阵与期望效用分析证实了区块链技术可凭借降低信息不对称来提升效率，但需要加密技术来平衡透明性与隐私风险。

Abstract: Addressing the conflict between enhancing financing efficiency and protecting privacy for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) utilizing blockchain, this paper innovatively constructs a tripartite static game model involving the government, a third-party platform, and SMEs to reveal the decision-making mechanism for privacy disclosure. The research demonstrates that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists when: 1) the net credibility benefits generated by strict government regulation $R_g-C_g$ exceed the total subsidies provided $S_p+S_e$ ; 2) the incremental technological benefits for the platform $R_p$ outweigh its incremental costs $C_p$ ; and 3) the financing cost savings for enterprises $D_e$ surpass their privacy risk losses $C_e$ . This equilibrium entails the government enforcing strict regulations, the platform implementing technological chain integration, and enterprises disclosing data while maintaining integrity. The approach, utilizing payoff matrices and expected utility analysis, confirms that blockchain technology can enhance efficiency by reducing information asymmetry, but requires cryptographic techniques to balance transparency and privacy risks.