《逻辑哲学论》中的概念隐喻

The Conceptual Metaphor in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

摘要: 《逻辑哲学论》是维特根斯坦早期代表作。作为语言哲学的集大成者，维特根斯坦强调对语言逻辑的澄清，认为对于不可说的东西，我们应保持沉默。然而在书中，我们不难发现文本中存在着大量的隐喻性语言，而非严格的逻辑论证，例如文末的“梯子隐喻”。这一现象该如何解释？基于以上思考与前人研究，本文追问两个基本问题：第一，维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中使用了哪些隐喻？第二，这一现象与书中表达的观点是否相悖？对此，我们以概念隐喻理论为基础，分析书中的隐喻使用。本文认为，隐喻性语言是维氏表达其关键思想以及帮助读者理解书中抽象概念的基础；其次，文本内部看似形成的矛盾恰恰说明了对于无法直接言说的“神秘”的东西，尝试去直接言说是无意义的，但可以通过“言其他”而进行显示。

Abstract: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus represents Wittgenstein’s early thought. As a landmark text in the philosophy of language, it emphasizes the clarification of the logical structure of language and famously asserts that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”. However, the text contains a significant number of metaphorical expressions rather than purely logical demonstrations—for instance, the “ladder metaphor” at the end of the book. How should this phenomenon be understood? Based on previous studies and the reflections above, this paper addresses two fundamental questions: First, what kinds of metaphors does Wittgenstein employ in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? Second, do these metaphors contradict the central claims of the work? To explore these questions, this paper adopts the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory to analyze Wittgenstein’s metaphorical language. It argues, first, that metaphors serve as a crucial means by which Wittgenstein conveys his core philosophical ideas and facilitates readers’ understanding of abstract concepts. Second, the apparent internal contradictions in the text actually underscore Wittgenstein’s view that the mystical—the unsayable—cannot be directly expressed; yet, it can be “shown” through indirect, metaphorical means.