现象学视域下人工智能的发展困境与突破路径

The Development Dilemma and Breakthrough Path of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of Phenomenology

摘要: 本文从现象学角度探讨人工智能在模拟人类意识和认知过程中的局限性，并提出具身性转向的必要性。通过分析胡塞尔、梅洛–庞蒂和海德格尔的现象学理论，文章指出经典人工智能在处理意向性、具身认知和情感隐喻等方面的不足。梅洛–庞蒂的具身现象学强调身体在认知中的核心作用，海德格尔的“在世存在”概念则为理解认知的动态交互机制提供了存在论基础。文章进一步探讨了具身性转向对人工智能设计的影响，提出非表征性理论和在世存在的设计原则，强调智能行为应基于身体与环境的直接交互。

Abstract: This paper explores the limitations of artificial intelligence (AI) in simulating human consciousness and cognitive processes from a phenomenological perspective, and proposes the necessity of an embodied turn. By analyzing the phenomenological theories of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger, the paper points out the inadequacies of classical AI in addressing intentionality, embodied cognition, and emotional metaphor. Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology emphasizes the central role of the body in cognition, while Heidegger’s concept of “Dasein” (being-in-the-world) provides an ontological foundation for understanding the dynamic interactive mechanisms of cognition. The paper further investigates the impact of the embodied turn on AI design, putting forward non-representational theories and design principles based on “being-in-the-world”, and emphasizes that intelligent behavior should be rooted in the direct interaction between the body and the environment.