本真共在的可能性——对诠释学循环论述方法的辩护与使用

The Possibility of Authentic Mitsein—A Defense and Application of the Hermeneutic Circle Method

摘要: 对海德格尔基础存在论的研究常常会导向一个伦理缺失的结论，即由海德格尔未曾通过共在概念揭示出“他人”的本真性，得出他人概念在基础存在论中不具备本真性的结论，从而最终认定基础存在论中此在与他人的交流是沉沦式的。但这实际上是一种对于海德格尔文本的误读或对其诠释学方法的误用，这种误读的根本原因是未能在理解与解读中贯彻现象学家所经常采用的诠释学循环的写作方法。实际上“本真共在”不仅在《存在与时间》中就有所体现，并且，出于对于共在概念的严谨研究，我们也必须进一步将其展开。而由此展开的“本真共在”，将为我们重新思考道德概念及其具体道德观念和行为提供一种独特的生存论进路，并揭示海德格尔思想中潜藏的伦理维度。

Abstract: Studies on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology often lead to a conclusion of ethical deficiency, namely, that because Heidegger did not reveal the authenticity of the “Other” through the concept of Mitsein, it is concluded that the concept of the Other lacks authenticity in fundamental ontology, thereby ultimately asserting that Dasein’s interaction with others in fundamental ontology is a mode of Verfallenheit. However, this is actually a misreading of Heidegger’s text or a misuse of his hermeneutical method. The fundamental reason for this misreading is the failure to consistently apply the hermeneutical circle, a method frequently employed by phenomenologists, in understanding and interpretation. In fact, “Eigentliches Mitsein” is not only already present in Being and Time, but also, for a rigorous study of the concept of Being-with, we must further elaborate on it. This elaborated “authentic Being-with” will provide a unique existential-ontological approach for us to rethink the concept of morality and its specific moral ideas and behaviors, and reveal the hidden ethical dimension in Heidegger’s thought.