网络平台佣金浮动下的零售商收益博弈

Game of Retailers’ Profits under Fluctuating Commissions of Online Platforms

摘要: 本研究揭示了网络平台佣金浮动对供应链利润分配的深层影响。通过混合供应链模型分析发现，佣金上调会推高线上售价，挤压零售商利润空间，同时促使平台提升服务水平以维持竞争力。在制造商主导传统渠道时，零售商利润呈线性下降；而在零售商主导时，系统呈现更复杂的非线性关系——当服务水平影响因子超过0.5时，将触发供应链成员的策略性违约风险。研究特别指出，平台市场力量的扩张正在重塑渠道权力格局：一方面通过数据控制权强化主导地位，另一方面削弱零售商议价能力，使制造商陷入线上成本转嫁与线下定价受限的双重困境。这些发现为数字经济时代的供应链治理提供了重要启示，建议建立佣金透明机制并关注服务与价格的协同效应，以维护供应链整体稳定性。

Abstract: This study reveals the deep impact of the floating commission of the network platform on the profit distribution of the supply chain. Through the analysis of the mixed supply chain model, it is found that the increase in commission will push up the online price, squeeze the profit space of retailers, and promote the platform to improve the service level to maintain competitiveness. When the manufacturer dominates the traditional channel, the retailer’s profit decreases linearly; When the retailer is dominant, the system presents a more complex nonlinear relationship—when the service level impact factor exceeds 0.5, it will trigger the strategic default risk of supply chain members. In particular, the study points out that the expansion of platform market power is reshaping the channel power pattern: on the one hand, it strengthens the dominant position through data control, on the other hand, it weakens the bargaining power of retailers, making manufacturers fall into the double dilemma of online cost transfer and offline pricing constraints. These findings provide important enlightenment for the supply chain governance in the era of digital economy. It is suggested to establish a transparent Commission mechanism and pay attention to the synergy between service and price in order to maintain the overall stability of the supply chain.