格里塞茨–菲尼斯新自然法学对休谟问题的处理

The Grisez-Finnis New Natural Law Theory’s Approach to the Hume’s Problem

摘要: 长期以来，理论界针对休谟问题争论不止。休谟问题引入法学领域后也持续引发讨论，作为在法学发展中长期占据重要地位的自然法学派亦无法回避这一问题，然而古典自然法学从“实然”到“应然”的推导在受到法律实证主义的冲击之后，如何处理好法学领域中的休谟问题成了自然法现代化的必经之路，格里塞茨–菲尼斯新自然法学派的理论体系提出了崭新的自然法观念，揭示出本体论次序与认识论次序的相反，试图从人在实践理性活动中所展现出来的认知结构来理解人类本性，又利用实践理性的不证自明性与人的本性保持了距离，由此否定从“实然”推导到“应然”的过程，并基于自由意志和目的观念，将人类幸福视为总体目标，从“人的主体性”又迈向“人的主动性”，完成了对休谟问题的处理，使自然法焕发新的生机。

Abstract: The Hume’s problem has long been a subject of persistent debate in theoretical circles. When introduced into the field of jurisprudence, this issue continues to provoke discussions. The natural law school, which has long occupied a significant position in legal development, cannot evade this problem. After the derivation from “is” to “ought” in classical natural law was challenged by legal positivism, addressing the Hume’s problem in jurisprudence has become an inevitable path for the modernization of natural law. The theoretical system of the Grisez-Finnis new natural law school proposes a novel conception of natural law, revealing the inverse relationship between ontological order and epistemological order. It attempts to understand human nature through the cognitive structure manifested in practical rational activities, while maintaining distance from human nature through the self-evident nature of practical rationality, thereby negating the derivation process from “is” to “ought”. Based on concepts of free will and purpose, this school regards human flourishing as the ultimate goal, progresses from “human subjectivity” to “human initiative”, completes its response to the Hume’s problem, and revitalizes natural law with renewed vitality.