责任减免在我国独立董事制度中的选择性适用

Selective Application of Liability Reduction and Exemption in Chinese Independent Director System

摘要: “康美药业案”判决发布后，天价的民事赔偿金导致了独立董事离职潮。该现象表面上是微薄薪水与天价赔偿额之间的矛盾，实质上是独立董事的职责错位。考虑到我国引入一元制公司治理结构的政策目标，可以参考美国董事救济制度中的董事责任减免制度，对其内容进行选择性适用，改造为“独立董事民事责任减免制度”，以求缓解离职潮现象，并在长期上完善我国独立董事职责分配机制，逐步解决职责错位问题。

Abstract: After the promulgation of the judgment of the “Kangmei Pharmaceutical Case”, the sky-high civil compensation led to a wave of departures of independent directors. On the surface, the contradiction between the meager salary and the sky-high compensation is essentially the misalignment of the responsibilities of independent directors. Considering the policy goal of introducing a unified corporate governance structure in China, we can refer to the director liability reduction and exemption system in the US director relief system, selectively apply its content, and transform it into the “independent director civil liability reduction and exemption system”, in order to alleviate the phenomenon of resignation, improve the responsibility distribution mechanism of independent directors in China in the long term, and gradually solve the problem of misalignment of responsibilities.