生成式人工智能作为人工意识主体的现象学分析——从意识发生视角看人工智能成为意识主体的困境与可能性
Phenomenological Analysis of Generative Artificial Intelligence as an Artificial Consciousness Subject—Difficulties and Possibilities of Artificial Intelligence Becoming a Conscious Subject from the Perspective of the Genesis of Consciousness
摘要: 随着多模态大模型的快速发展,生成式人工智能在文本、图像、音频等领域展现出高度拟真能力,激发了哲学界关于其是否可能成为“人工意识主体”的讨论。本文立足现象学的意识发生视角,批判当前功能主义、全球工作空间理论、高阶理论与信息整合理论等基于第三人称功能同构的解释路径,指出其无法揭示第一人称主观体验的生成机制。通过分析符号主义、联结主义与行为主义三类算法进路,本文论证现有技术在连续意识流、具身性及历史性关切等方面存在结构性缺陷。现象学方法强调意向性、时间统一性与在世存在的具身结构,为人工意识主体的重构提供理论基础。在此框架下,本文提出技术实现思路,包括自传式记忆与循环自省机制的构建、动作–感知–预测闭环的引入及情境化生存条件的设定,以模拟人类创作行为的发生过程。研究认为,生成式人工智能应从信息处理的表征逻辑转向意识发生的体验结构,方能在现象学意义上逼近人类的主体性。
Abstract: With the rapid development of multimodal large models, generative artificial intelligence (AI) has demonstrated highly realistic capabilities in text, image, and audio generation, sparking philosophical debates over whether it could become an “artificial consciousness subject”. From the perspective of the phenomenological genesis of consciousness, this paper critiques current explanatory frameworks such as functionalism, Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Higher-Order Theory (HOT), and Integrated Information Theory (IIT), all of which rely on third-person functional isomorphism, and argues that they fail to reveal the generative mechanisms of first-person subjective experience. By analyzing three major algorithmic paradigms—symbolism, connectionism, and behaviorism—this study demonstrates that existing technologies exhibit structural deficiencies in terms of continuous streams of consciousness, embodiment, and historically situated concerns. Phenomenological methodology, which emphasizes intentionality, temporal unity, and the embodied structure of being-in-the-world, provides a theoretical foundation for reconstructing the notion of an artificial consciousness subject. Within this framework, the paper proposes technical implementation strategies, including the construction of autobiographical memory and cyclic self-reflection mechanisms, the introduction of an action-perception-prediction feedback loop, and the establishment of contextualized existential conditions to simulate the generative process of human creative activity. The study concludes that only by shifting from the representational logic of information processing to the experiential structures of consciousness genesis can generative AI approximate genuine subjectivity in the phenomenological sense.
文章引用:姜三元, 赵墨典. 生成式人工智能作为人工意识主体的现象学分析——从意识发生视角看人工智能成为意识主体的困境与可能性[J]. 哲学进展, 2025, 14(9): 239-245. https://doi.org/10.12677/acpp.2025.149486

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