考虑消费者行为的电子商务退货决策研究

Research on E-Commerce Return Decision-Making Considering Consumer Behavior

摘要: 当前电子商务行业发展迅猛，市场逐渐饱和且资源有限，平台与商家为争夺有限市场份额、增强自身竞争力，纷纷推行过度宽松的退货政策——这类政策虽短期内刺激了消费需求，却也引发了大量机会主义退货行为，导致退货率持续高升。高退货率不仅提高了电商平台和商家的运营成本，增加消费者的决策成本，还通过退货物流环节的运输能耗与包装废弃物，加剧环境污染，因此需建立多方协同治理机制。本研究以Stackelberg博弈理论为基础，构建政府主导下的三方动态博弈模型，聚焦机会主义消费者行为占比差异下的多主体决策互动机制，旨在探讨政府通过设立环保奖惩机制，对电商商家及消费者行为的调节作用，进而优化退货政策，为促进电子商务的可持续发展提供理论支撑与实践路径。

Abstract: The current e-commerce industry is experiencing rapid development, yet the market is gradually becoming saturated with limited resources. To compete for market share and enhance their competitiveness, platforms and merchants are widely adopting excessively lenient return policies. While such policies may stimulate consumer demand in the short term, they have also triggered a large volume of opportunistic returns, leading to persistently high return rates. High return rates not only increase operational costs for e-commerce platforms and merchants, as well as decision-making costs for consumers, but also exacerbate environmental pollution through transportation energy consumption and packaging waste generated during the return logistics process. Consequently, establishing a multi-party collaborative governance mechanism is imperative. Based on Stackelberg game theory, this study constructs a tripartite dynamic game model under government leadership, focusing on the decision-making interactions among multiple entities under varying proportions of opportunistic consumer behavior. It aims to explore how the government, by implementing environmental protection incentives and penalties, can regulate the behavior of e-commerce merchants and consumers, thereby optimizing return policies. The findings provide theoretical and practical guidance for promoting the sustainable development of e-commerce.