碳中和背景下跨境绿色投融资四方演化博弈及仿真分析
Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Cross-Border Green Investment and Financing under the Background ofCarbon Neutrality
摘要: 面对全球气候治理新形势,绿色投融资是推动实现低碳转型、推进碳中和进程的重要机制。绿色投资高投入、高风险、长周期等不确定性致使融资渠道狭窄,投融资合作动力不足。本文将跨境绿色投融资四个主要相关主体“中国政府、东道国政府、中国金融机构和中国企业”置于统一框架下,在引入公众意愿这一外部因素的基础上构建四方演化博弈模型,基于Matlab进行数值仿真,模拟关键参数对复制动态系统各主体稳定策略的影响。研究结果显示:在四方演化博弈系统16组纯策略均衡点中有6组在一定条件下可形成渐进稳定策略组合;初始意愿对演进路径有显著影响,初始意愿较低时政府引导是绿色投融资发展行稳致远的保障;公众意愿是博弈主体决策过程中的关键因素,绿色投资运营收益提升是企业落实绿色投资的最强驱动力,绿色投资预期风险损失降低增强了系统整体向理想稳定策略演进的倾向。
Abstract: In the context of evolving global climate governance, green investment and financing serve as crucial mechanisms for driving low-carbon transformation and advancing carbon neutrality. However, the inherent uncertainties of green investment—characterized by high capital intensity, significant risks, and long payback periods—often lead to constrained financing channels and insufficient motivation for collaborative investment and financing. This study integrates the four key stakeholders in cross-border green investment and financing—namely, the Chinese government, host country governments, Chinese financial institutions, and Chinese enterprises—within a unified analytical framework. By introducing public preference as an external factor, a quadrilateral evolutionary game model is constructed. Numerical simulations, conducted using Matlab, simulate the impact of key parameters on the stable strategies of each stakeholder within the replicator dynamics system. The findings reveal that: Among the 16 pure-strategy equilibrium points in the quadrilateral evolutionary game system, 6 can form asymptotically stable strategy profiles under specific conditions; Initial willingness significantly influences evolutionary trajectories; government guidance is essential for the stable and sustainable development of green investment and financing when initial willingness is low; Public preference is a critical factor influencing stakeholders’ decision-making; Increased operational returns from green investments represent the strongest driver for enterprises to implement such investments; and reducing the expected risk losses associated with green investments enhances the system’s overall tendency to evolve towards the desired stable strategy.
文章引用:雷亚男. 碳中和背景下跨境绿色投融资四方演化博弈及仿真分析[J]. 可持续发展, 2025, 15(9): 126-143. https://doi.org/10.12677/sd.2025.159262

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