笛卡尔的悬置论方法研究

An Inquiry into Descartes’ Epoché

摘要: 笛卡尔的悬置论(Epoché)在其哲学中占有很重要的地位，作为一种哲学方法论，旨在通过暂时搁置对既有信念的判断，以寻求更加稳固的知识的一种理论。本文围绕笛卡尔《第一哲学沉思集》中提出的论证方法与悬置策略进行分析，指出其哲学目标是重建一个“稳定而持久”的知识体系。与胡塞尔对“自然态度”的搁置不同，笛卡尔以方法论怀疑为核心，旨在排除不可靠的知识，其间甚至能够否定世界存在。为了达到这一目标，笛卡尔笔下的沉思者采取了激进的怀疑策略，拒绝一切存在不确定性的命题，从而将感官经验与常识视为不可信赖的知识来源。然而，这一标准本身也面临悖论式的质疑：是否清晰可感知即为真？本文认为，笛卡尔的怀疑方法完成了传统形而上学本体论向现代认识论的转换，为现代哲学的发展开辟了全新的道路，但其真理标准仍需进一步澄清与辩护。笛卡尔的悬置论在知识论中的意义深远，它不仅重新定义了怀疑与知识的关系，也为现代哲学中的知识获取问题提供了新的视角。

Abstract: Descartes’ theory of Epoché occupies a pivotal position within his philosophy. As a methodological strategy, it seeks to attain more secure and indubitable knowledge by temporarily suspending judgment on pre-existing beliefs. Focusing on the argumentative methods and suspension strategies proposed in Meditations on First Philosophy, this paper argues that Descartes’ ultimate aim is to reconstruct a “stable and enduring” system of knowledge. Unlike Husserl’s suspension of the “natural attitude”, Descartes grounds his approach in methodological doubt, striving to eliminate all unreliable knowledge—even to the extent of denying the existence of the external world. To achieve this, the meditator adopts a radical strategy of doubt, rejecting any proposition marked by even the slightest uncertainty, thus treating sensory experience and common sense as untrustworthy sources of knowledge. Yet this standard itself faces a paradoxical challenge: does clarity and distinctness of perception necessarily guarantee truth? This paper contends that Descartes’ method of doubt signals a paradigmatic shift from the ontological focus of traditional metaphysics to the epistemological foundations of modern philosophy, thereby opening a new path for philosophical inquiry. Nevertheless, his criterion of truth still requires further clarification and justification. The significance of Descartes’ Epoché within epistemology is thus far-reaching: it not only redefines the relationship between doubt and knowledge, but also offers a renewed perspective on the problem of knowledge acquisition in modern philosophy.