考虑销售努力与退货行为的制造商直播渠道策略研究

Research on Manufacturer’s Live Streaming Channel Strategy Considering Sales Effort and Return Behavior

摘要: 本文构建由制造商、零售商和网红主播组成的三方供应链博弈模型，研究存在网红主播销售努力和消费者退货行为的情形下，制造商在单一传统渠道(B)、单一直播渠道(E)和混合双渠道(S)三种模式下的最优策略选择。通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型，使用逆向归纳法推导出各模式下价格、努力水平、退货量及其利润的均衡解。研究发现：直播销售价并不总是低于传统零售价，其关系受消费者敏感系数影响；混合双渠道模式下制造商的利润、市场需求和退货量均最高；当消费者对网红销售努力敏感且佣金率较低时制造商才会选择直播渠道。

Abstract: This paper constructs a tripartite supply chain game model involving manufacturer, retailer and live streamer. It investigates the optimal strategy selection for the manufacturer under three modes: single traditional channel (B), single livestream channel (E), and hybrid dual-channel (S), in the context of consumer returns and the sales effort behavior of the influencer. By establishing a Stackelberg game model and using backward induction, the equilibrium solutions for price, effort level, return quantity, and profit under each mode are derived. The study finds that the livestream selling price is not always lower than the traditional retail price; their relationship depends on the consumer sensitivity coefficient. Under the hybrid dual-channel mode, the manufacturer’s profit, market demand, and return quantity are the highest. The manufacturer will only choose the livestream channel when consumers are sensitive to the influencer’s sales effort and the commission rate is low.