控股股东股权质押对企业债务融资成本的影响——基于A股上市公司的实证研究
The Impact of Controlling Shareholders’ Equity Pledge on Corporate Debt Financing Costs—An Empirical Study Based on A-Share Listed Companies
摘要: 股权质押作为控股股东常用融资方式,其蕴含的风险和信号效应对企业债务融资成本影响深远。股价波动引发的强制平仓风险,会威胁控股股东控制权与企业稳定运营;股权质押传递的负面信号,还会推高债权人和中小股东的风险预期,导致企业借款成本增加。因此,研究股权质押对企业债务融资成本的影响意义重大。本文以信号传递、委托代理理论为基础,选取2018~2024年A股上市公司,运用固定效应回归等方法,探讨股权质押对债务融资成本的影响。实证结果表明控股股东股权质押会提高上市公司债务融资成本。进一步研究证实,大股东掏空在其中发挥作用,且经稳健性检验验证结论可靠。基于此,本文提出建议:投资者需增强对股权质押的认知,理性投资;公司应完善治理结构,强化股权制衡与信息披露;监管部门要健全政策法规,防范股权质押风险。
Abstract: As a common financing method for controlling shareholders, equity pledge has far-reaching impacts on corporate debt financing costs due to its inherent risks and signaling effects. The risk of mandatory liquidation caused by stock price fluctuations may threaten the controlling rights of controlling shareholders and the stable operation of enterprises; meanwhile, the negative signals transmitted by equity pledge will also raise the risk expectations of creditors and minority shareholders, leading to an increase in corporate borrowing costs. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the impact of equity pledge on corporate debt financing costs. Based on the signal transmission theory and principal-agent theory, this paper selects A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2024 and uses methods such as fixed-effect regression to explore the impact of equity pledge on debt financing costs. The empirical results show that the equity pledge of controlling shareholders will increase the debt financing costs of listed companies. Further research confirms that the “tunneling behavior” of major shareholders plays a mediating role in this relationship, and the conclusion is reliable through robustness tests. Based on this, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: Investors should enhance their understanding of equity pledge and make rational investments; Companies should improve their governance structure, and strengthen equity checks and balances as well as information disclosure; Regulatory authorities should improve policies and regulations to prevent the risks of equity pledge.
文章引用:苏宵赐, 徐翩. 控股股东股权质押对企业债务融资成本的影响——基于A股上市公司的实证研究[J]. 国际会计前沿, 2025, 14(5): 1302-1313. https://doi.org/10.12677/fia.2025.145145

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