论破产程序中待履行合同解除权的限制

Restricting the Right to Terminate Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy

摘要: 本文聚焦破产程序中待履行合同解除权的限制问题展开研究。首先对待履行合同这一概念作出清晰界定，即在破产申请获得受理之前便已成立，且合同双方均未完成义务履行的双务合同，并指出我国《企业破产法》第18条赋予管理人解除或继续履行合同的权利，从立法角度来看，设置这项权利的初衷，是为了让破产财产的规模实现最大化，从而为全体债权人的受偿权益提供保障。但该权利存在范围过宽、判断标准缺失、相对方救济不足等问题，易引发利益失衡与“同案不同判”现象。其次，从理论层面论证限制该解除权的必要性：既符合公平与诚信原则，可避免管理人单方决策破坏合同信赖基础、沦为利益再分配工具，又能维护市场交易安全与效率，减少交易主体的不确定性预期。最后，结合比较法经验提出完善我国规则体系的路径：确立利益平衡与诚实信用的核心原则，构建特殊合同类型化处理机制，优化程序性约束(增设说明义务、强化相对方权利)，并强化法院实质性审查标准，最终实现破产程序公平、效率与秩序价值的统一。

Abstract: This paper studies the restriction of the right to terminate executory contracts in bankruptcy proceedings. Firstly, it clarifies the definition of executory contracts, points out the legislative purpose of Article 18 of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law granting administrators contract disposal rights, and identifies problems in practice such as overly broad scope, lack of standards and insufficient remedies. Secondly, it demonstrates the necessity of restriction theoretically: it conforms to the principles of fairness and good faith, and maintains transaction security and efficiency. Finally, drawing on comparative legal experience, the pathway to improving China’s rule system is proposed: establishing the core principles of interest balancing and good faith, constructing a mechanism for categorizing special contract types, optimizing procedural constraints (by adding disclosure obligations and strengthening counterparty rights), and enhancing the court’s substantive review standards, ultimately achieving a balance between fairness, efficiency, and order in bankruptcy proceedings.