论黑格尔逻辑学的“现实”范畴

On the Category of “Actuality” in Hegel’s Logic

摘要: “现实”是黑格尔逻辑体系的重要范畴，与以感性对象为“现实”的通俗含义不同，黑格尔认为“现实”是包含本质在自身内的实存，是思维与存在扬弃了自身的直接性、外在性之后形成的统一。因此，现实与理性在思辨哲学中并不像通俗看法那样截然对立，而是相互转化的。黑格尔批评康德将理性肤浅化，批驳康德认为人类不能认识事物自身、只能认识现象等观点，指出理性能够把握事物的现实内核，而不只是停留于事物的外部形态即现象世界；理性也能够在现实世界中不断实现自身，而不是只能永远追求彼岸遥不可及的至善目标。黑格尔肯定了斯宾诺莎的“实体”是真正的哲学研究的开端，同时他又指出，现实范畴、实体、必然性等只是逻辑体系的环节，不是真理本身。哲学不能停留在这样的开端阶段，而应当进展到具有自我意识和个体原则的概念范畴。

Abstract: “Actuality” (Wirklichkeit) is a pivotal category in Hegel’s logical system. Unlike the conventional understanding that equates “reality” with sensible objects, Hegel defines “actuality” as an existence that contains essence within itself—a unity formed when thought and being sublate their immediacy and externality. Consequently, within speculative philosophy, actuality and reason are not diametrically opposed as in commonplace views; rather, they are mutually transformative. Hegel criticizes Kant for trivializing reason and refutes his claims that humans cannot know things-in-themselves but can only apprehend phenomena. He emphasizes that reason can grasp the actual core of things, rather than remaining confined to their external forms (i.e., the phenomenal world). Moreover, reason is capable of continually actualizing itself within the real world, instead of perpetually striving toward an unattainable highest good in the beyond. Hegel acknowledges that Spinoza’s “substance” constitutes the genuine starting point of philosophical inquiry. Simultaneously, he clarifies that categories such as actuality, substance, and necessity are merely developmental moments within the logical system, not truth itself. Philosophy must not remain at this initial stage but should advance to the category of the “Concept” (Begriff), which embodies self-consciousness and the principle of individuality.