全网最低价条款的反垄断法分析

An Analysis of the Anti-Monopoly Law on the Lowest Price Clause of the Whole Network

摘要: 网络直播生态中普遍存在的“全网最低价”机制，本质上是代理销售模式下衍生出的广义平台最惠国待遇条款。从动态竞争视角审视，该条款通过限制商家跨平台价格调整自主权，形成事实上的价格锁定效应，具体表现为：商家在其他销售渠道实施降价策略的激励显著弱化，进而导致多平台价格体系趋同化，最终破坏数字市场的价格发现功能与竞争活力。针对此类条款的反垄断规制路径选择，需结合市场力量集中程度与行为性质进行差异化分析：在滥用市场支配地位层面，应重点考察平台在相关市场中的控制力界定及价格限制行为的排他性效果；在横向垄断协议认定方面，需区分传统协同行为与轴辐型价格协调，尤其关注平台是否通过算法机制实施隐性价格共谋；在纵向垄断协议属性方面，虽代理关系存在不改变纵向价格约束的违法性判断，但需避免将此类条款简单归类为转售价格维持，而应结合条款对二级市场价格竞争的实际影响进行效果分析。

Abstract: The pervasive “lowest price across platforms” mechanism in live-streaming commerce ecosystems essentially constitutes a generalized platform Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clause derived from agency sales models. From a dynamic competition perspective, this clause creates de facto price-locking effects by restricting merchants’ autonomy in adjusting prices across different platforms. This manifests in three interconnected stages: merchants demonstrate significantly weakened incentives to implement price reductions through alternative sales channels, which subsequently leads to convergence of pricing structures across multiple platforms, ultimately impairing the price discovery functions and competitive vitality of digital markets. The selection of antitrust regulatory approaches for such clauses requires differentiated analysis that considers both market power concentration levels and behavioral characteristics. When addressing potential abuse of market dominance, regulatory focus should center on defining platform control forces within relevant markets and assessing the exclusionary effects of price restriction behaviors. For horizontal monopoly agreement determinations, it becomes crucial to distinguish between traditional concerted practices and hub-and-spoke price coordination, with particular scrutiny given to whether platforms facilitate implicit price collusion through algorithmic mechanisms. Regarding the classification of vertical monopoly agreements, while the existence of agency relationships does not alter the illegality determination of vertical price restraints, regulators should avoid simplistically categorizing such clauses as resale price maintenance (RPM). Instead, analysis should emphasize the actual impact of these clauses on secondary market price competition through effects-based assessment.