股权回购型对赌协议与减资程序的法理纠缠与路径突围——基于2023年《公司法》修订的制度回应
The Jurisdictional Entanglement and Path Breakthrough of Equity Repurchase-Based VAMs and Capital Reduction Procedures—An Institutional Response Based on the 2023 Company Law Revision
摘要: 股权回购型对赌协议在实践中面临司法裁判与法律适用的双重困境。2023年《公司法》修订虽调整了减资与资本公积金规则,但未根本解决减资作为回购前置条件的法理争议。本文分析资本维持原则与合同自由的冲突,指出减资程序的功能异化,进而提出“双轨规制”路径:一是资本维持柔性化,以偿付能力测试替代强制减资,确立“衡平偿付能力 + 资本充足率”标准;二是合同自由程序化,借类别股制度将回购条款内化为组织法规范。同时构建董事第三人责任、对赌债权破产劣后清偿及信息公示等风险防控机制。该模式以动态平衡保护债权人并提升投融资效率,豁免强制减资程序,推动公司法从形式资本管制向实质偿债能力监管转型,具有重要理论与实践意义。
Abstract: Equity repurchase-based Valuation Adjustment Mechanisms (VAMs), widely used in private equity investment as a risk-hedging tool, face dual challenges in judicial practice and legal application. Although the 2023 Company Law revision restructured capital reduction procedures and capital reserve rules, it did not fundamentally resolve the jurisprudential controversy regarding capital reduction as a mandatory precondition for share repurchases. This paper analyzes the inherent conflict between the rigid constraints of the capital maintenance principle and contractual freedom, highlighting the functional alienation of traditional capital reduction procedures. A “dual-track regulation” approach is proposed: first, a flexibility track for capital maintenance, replacing mandatory capital reduction with a solvency test based on the “equitable solvency + capital adequacy” standard; second, a proceduralization track for contractual freedom, incorporating repurchase clauses into organic legal norms via the category shares system. Supporting risk prevention mechanisms are also constructed, including directors’ third-party liability for solvency declarations, subordinated liquidation of VAM claims in bankruptcy, and mandatory information disclosure. This model dynamically balances creditor protection and investment efficiency by exempting compulsory capital reduction procedures when solvency requirements are met, signaling a modern transition from formal capital regulation to substantive solvency supervision in Chinese company law, with significant theoretical and practical implications.
文章引用:刘育铭. 股权回购型对赌协议与减资程序的法理纠缠与路径突围——基于2023年《公司法》修订的制度回应[J]. 争议解决, 2025, 11(10): 199-207. https://doi.org/10.12677/ds.2025.1110325

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