叔本华意志论中的理性位置及其康德式重构

The Position of Reason in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of the Will and Its Kantian Reconstruction

摘要: 在叔本华意志哲学的叙事中，我们可以发现其对于“意志”持一种先验意志论，在其《作为意志和表象的世界》中，叔本华将“意志”视为不可超越的本体，只能通过诸如审美、节制等方式暂时地压抑，而不能实现彻底的超越。然而，这样一种观点只是认为理性是服务于意志的工具，并没有自主的超越性力量。但是，在康德的《实践理性批判》中，康德提出了“实践理性”这一概念，认为理性可以通过自我立法，独立于经验和欲望地规定道德法则，让人们在道德实践中成为真正自由的主体。本文旨在探讨叔本华意志论中理性的从属性定位能否通过康德的“实践理性”理论得到修正，并进一步考察两者在道德动机与实践自由层面上的互补关系。进而揭示理性在节制欲望与实现实践自由中的可能角色，补充康德的实践理性与叔本华意志哲学之间的理论空白。

Abstract: In Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will, we find a form of transcendental voluntarism: in The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer conceives the “will” as an insurmountable metaphysical reality that can only be temporarily subdued—through aesthetic contemplation or ascetic self-restraint—but never fully transcended. In this framework, reason functions merely as a tool serving the will, lacking autonomous or transcendent power. By contrast, in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, the concept of practical reason designates the faculty of self-legislation that enables moral law to be determined independently of experience and desire, thereby granting the human being genuine freedom in moral action. This paper explores whether Schopenhauer’s subordination of reason to will can be theoretically revised through Kant’s notion of practical reason, and further examines the complementary relationship between the two in terms of moral motivation and practical freedom. Ultimately, the paper reveals the possible role of reason in regulating desire and realizing practical freedom, thereby filling the theoretical gap between Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will and Kant’s philosophy of reason.