自律与逍遥：康德与庄子自由概念的比较与综合

Autonomy and Xiaoyao: A Comparison and Synthesis of Kant’s and Zhuangzi’s Concepts of Freedom

摘要: 本文以康德与庄子的自由概念为核心，通过比较分析揭示二者在哲学基础上的根本差异及其理论困境。康德的自由建基于现象与物自体的先验区分，强调理性主体的自我立法与道德自律，却导致自由与自然的割裂，成为一种形式化、超越性的“自由”，缺乏在现实世界中的实现动力。庄子的自由则源于对“道”的体认与顺应，追求与自然合一的“逍遥”境界，是一种审美性的“自有”，但缺乏构建社会规范性秩序的主体性能动性。两者分别代表了规范性自由与存在性自有之间的深刻张力。本文进一步指出，黑格尔的辩证哲学为超越这一对立提供了概念工具：通过“扬弃”将康德的道德主体性与庄子的实体性直观纳入精神发展的历史进程中，最终在伦理生活中实现“具体的自由”，即既保持自我规定又融入客观世界的自由形态。在最后，通过吸收庄子的思想资源对自由这一形态进行补充，指出自由应既包含黑格尔的具体自由的社会历史维度，又保留庄子式自由的个体体验深度；既珍视理性建构的成就，又对理性的局限保持清醒。本研究旨在通过这一综合视角，推动对自由问题的更深层次理解。

Abstract: This paper focuses on the concepts of freedom in Kant and Zhuangzi, revealing through comparative analysis the fundamental differences in their philosophical foundations and their respective theoretical difficulties. Kant’s freedom is grounded in the transcendental distinction between phenomena and things in themselves, emphasizing the self-legislation of the rational subject and moral autonomy. However, this leads to a rift between freedom and nature, resulting in a formal, transcendent “freedom” that lacks the driving force for its actualization in the real world. Zhuangzi’s freedom, conversely, originates from the apprehension of and conformity to the “Dao,” pursuing the state of “free and easy wandering” in unity with nature. It represents an aesthetic “being-in-itself,” yet lacks the subjective agency for constructing a socially normative order. The two concepts respectively represent a profound tension between normative freedom and existential being-in-itself. This paper further proposes that Hegel’s dialectical philosophy provides the conceptual tools for transcending this opposition: through “sublation,” it incorporates Kantian moral subjectivity and Zhuangzi’s substantial intuition into the historical process of spiritual development, ultimately realizing “concrete freedom” in ethical life—a form of freedom that maintains self-determination while integrating into the objective world. Finally, by drawing on Zhuangzi’s intellectual resources, this conception of freedom is supplemented, suggesting that true freedom should encompass both the socio-historical dimension of Hegelian concrete freedom and the depth of individual experience characteristic of Zhuangzi’s freedom; it should cherish the achievements of rational construction while remaining aware of the limits of rationality. This study aims to promote a deeper understanding of the problem of freedom through this integrated perspective.