溢出效应下电商平台制造商生态标签“漂绿”行为的演化及扩散

Evolution and Diffusion of “Greenwashing” Behavior of E-Commerce Platform Manufacturers’ Ecological Labels under Spillover Effects

摘要: 电商平台在推动绿色消费方面成效显著，但其生态标签体系正面临严峻挑战。现实中，当部分制造商的“漂绿”行为被曝光时，消费者往往会对整个生态标签体系产生信任危机，导致所有贴标产品的市场接受度下降，然而，这种“连带效应”不仅未能有效遏制“漂绿”行为，反而使合规制造商为失信者买单，造成“劣币驱逐良币”的市场扭曲，最终削弱了平台经济绿色发展。为探明消费者信任危机下对平台制造商绿色生产决策的影响，本研究构建了制造商间绿色生产决策交互的演化博弈模型。通过分析系统均衡点的存在性及稳定性，并结合数值仿真，揭示了负外部溢出效应下平台制造商绿色生产的演化模式。研究发现：(1) 平台制造商初始选择“绿色生产”策略的比例与系统朝向期望方向演化的程度呈正相关；(2) 消费者因漂绿行为导致的平台绿色产品信任度下降，引发制造商间的负外部溢出效应，致使绿色生产制造商逐渐转向“漂绿”策略以获取市场份额和利润，最终导致系统陷入“不良”状态；(3) 平台制造商绿色协同收益(S)、漂绿行为被发现后的直接经济损失(F)及发现概率的提升，可促使系统从“漂绿生产”的不良锁定状态向“绿色生产”的预期状态演化。

Abstract: E-commerce platforms have achieved significant results in promoting green consumption, but their ecological labeling system is facing severe challenges. In reality, when the “greenwashing” behavior of some manufacturers is exposed, consumers often experience a crisis of trust in the entire ecological labeling system, leading to a decrease in market acceptance of all labeled products. However, this “cascading effect” not only fails to effectively curb greenwashing behavior, but also makes compliant manufacturers pay for dishonest individuals, resulting in a market distortion of “bad money driving out good money” and ultimately weakening the green development of the platform economy. To investigate the impact of consumer trust crisis on platform manufacturers’ green production decisions, this study constructed an evolutionary game model of green production decision interaction among manufacturers. By analyzing the existence and stability of the equilibrium point in the system, and combining it with numerical simulation, the evolution mode of green production by platform manufacturers under negative external spillover effects is revealed. Research has found that: (1) the proportion of platform manufacturers initially choosing a “green production” strategy is positively correlated with the degree to which the system evolves towards the desired direction; (2) The decrease in trust in green products on the platform caused by consumer greenwashing behavior has triggered negative external spillover effects among manufacturers, leading green production manufacturers to gradually shift to a “greenwashing” strategy to gain market share and profits, ultimately resulting in the system falling into a “bad” state; (3) The green collaborative benefits (S) of platform manufacturers, the direct economic losses (F) after the discovery of greenwashing behavior, and the increase in detection probability can promote the system to evolve from the adverse locking state of “greenwashing production” to the expected state of “green production”.