区块链技术引入与电商平台决策干预下的供应商竞争博弈分析
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Supplier Competition under Blockchain Technology Adoption and E-Commerce Platform Decision Intervention
DOI: 10.12677/ecl.2025.14113660, PDF,   
作者: 阳树帆:南京信息工程大学管理工程学院,江苏 南京
关键词: 供应链电子商务销售合同区块链技术Supply Chain E-Commerce Sales Contract Blockchain Economy
摘要: 本文构建了一个包含高级供应商、低级供应商和电商平台的供应链模型。其中高级供应商通过电子商务平台销售产品,低级供应商可以选择转售合同或代理销售合同销售替代产品。研究分析区块链技术的引入对供应链中各成员决策和利润影响。研究发现,区块链技术的引入能提升消费者对产品质量的信任,进而影响供应商的定价策略和利润。高级供应商采用区块链技术后,产品价格上升,消费者对其产品的需求保持不变,而低级供应商产品的需求减少。当低级供应商采用代理销售合同时,区块链技术的引入同样会提高产品价格,但对高级供应商产品的需求保持不变,而低级供应商产品的需求减少。区块链技术的采用对供应链成员的利润影响取决于区块链的运营成本、产品的质量以及佣金率等因素。电商平台通过调整佣金和激励措施,可引导供应链达到最优均衡状态,实现利润最大化。研究结论表明,电商平台应主动干预区块链采用成本与销售合同的选择,推动区块链技术在供应链中的应用,以提升供应链透明度和效率。
Abstract: This paper constructs a supply-chain model comprising an upstream (high-type) supplier, a downstream (low-type) supplier, and an e-commerce platform. The high-type supplier distributes its product exclusively through the platform, whereas the low-type supplier may choose between a reselling contract and an agency-selling contract to offer a substitutable product. We analytically examine how the introduction of blockchain technology affects the decisions and profits of every supply-chain participant. The results reveal that blockchain adoption enhances consumers’ confidence in product quality, thereby reshaping pricing strategies and profit distributions. When the high-type supplier deploys blockchain, its wholesale and retail prices rise, yet the quantity demanded for its product remains unchanged; by contrast, demand for the low-type supplier’s product declines. If the low-type supplier operates under an agency contract, blockchain still drives the product price upward, leaves the high-type supplier’s demand unaffected, and reduces the demand for the low-type product. The profit implications of blockchain for each member hinge on the technology’s operational cost, product quality, and the platform’s commission rate. By adjusting commissions and incentive schemes, the e-commerce platform can steer the chain toward a Pareto-improving equilibrium and maximize its own profit. The findings suggest that the platform should proactively intervene in both the adoption cost of blockchain and the selection of sales contracts to facilitate blockchain diffusion, thereby enhancing supply-chain transparency and efficiency.
文章引用:阳树帆. 区块链技术引入与电商平台决策干预下的供应商竞争博弈分析[J]. 电子商务评论, 2025, 14(11): 2074-2081. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2025.14113660

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