在线旅游平台商家营销问题的演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Merchant Marketing Issues in Online Travel Platforms
摘要: 随着在线旅游市场的快速发展,平台商家在营销过程中出现的虚假宣传、服务缩水与不合理定价等问题日益引发社会关注。这些营销乱象不仅损害游客权益,也对平台声誉与行业生态构成挑战。由于这些行为涉及游客、平台商家与在线旅游平台三方之间的策略互动与动态反馈,传统静态分析方法难以有效揭示其长期演化规律。为此,本文基于有限理性假设,构建三方演化博弈模型,通过建立支付矩阵与复制动态方程,系统分析营销治理系统中各主体的策略演化路径,重点考察商家违规收益、平台治理成本、游客监督意愿等关键参数对系统均衡的影响。此外,本研究利用MATLAB进行数值仿真试验,模拟不同情况下系统均衡点的动态变化,从而揭示影响营销治理效果的内在机制。本文旨在为理解平台商家营销问题的复杂动态提供理论依据,并为相关治理策略的制定提供决策参考。
Abstract: With the rapid development of the online travel market, marketing issues such as false advertising, service degradation, and unreasonable pricing by platform merchants have attracted increasing societal concern. These marketing irregularities not only harm the rights and interests of tourists but also pose significant challenges to platform reputation and the overall industry ecosystem. As these behaviors involve strategic interactions and dynamic feedback among tourists, platform merchants, and the online travel platform itself, traditional static analytical methods struggle to effectively reveal their long-term evolutionary patterns. To address this, based on the assumption of bounded rationality, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model. By establishing a payoff matrix and replicator dynamic equations, it systematically analyzes the strategic evolution paths of various actors within the marketing governance system, focusing on the impact of key parameters such as merchant gains from violations, platform governance costs, and tourist willingness to supervise on the system equilibrium. Furthermore, numerical simulations using MATLAB are conducted to simulate the dynamic changes of system equilibrium points under different scenarios, thereby revealing the internal mechanisms influencing the effectiveness of marketing governance. This study aims to provide a theoretical basis for understanding the complex dynamics of platform merchants’ marketing issues and to offer decision-making support for formulating relevant governance strategies.
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