从“改变世界”到“算法支配”:《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》对人工智能时代人类主体性的启示
From “Changing the World” to “Algorithmic Domination”: The Implications of “Theses on Feuerbach” for Human Subjectivity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence
摘要: 本文以马克思《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》的实践哲学为理论框架,探讨人工智能时代人类主体性面临的挑战与重构路径。马克思批判传统哲学“解释世界”的局限,提出“改变世界”的实践转向,强调人通过感性活动与环境的辩证互动塑造主体性。在算法全面渗透的当下,技术异化呈现新形态:数据成为生产资料催生“数字无产阶级”,算法推荐系统重构认知模式,平台经济中的量化逻辑将劳动异化为可计算的数据流。这些现象折射出马克思所批判的“抽象统治”在数字时代的复归——算法通过隐蔽的认知殖民化和决策权让渡,削弱了人类对世界的实践能动性。最终,本文主张在认知、技术与制度层面重建人类主体性,使人工智能从异化工具转化为“自由人联合体”的赋能者,实现马克思“改变世界”哲学精神的当代复归。
Abstract: This article takes Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” as the theoretical framework to explore the challenges and reconstruction paths faced by human subjectivity in the era of artificial intelligence. Marx criticized the limitations of traditional philosophy in “explaining the world” and proposed a practical shift towards “changing the world”, emphasizing that human subjectivity is shaped through the dialectical interaction between sensory activities and the environment. In the current era of comprehensive penetration of algorithms, technological alienation presents new forms: data becomes the means of production, giving rise to the “digital proletariat”, algorithmic recommendation systems reconstruct cognitive models, and the quantitative logic in platform economy alienates labor into computable data streams. These phenomena reflect the return of Marx’s criticism of “abstract rule” in the digital age: algorithms weaken human practical initiative in the world through hidden cognitive colonization and decision-making power transfer. Ultimately, this article advocates for the reconstruction of human subjectivity at the cognitive, ethical, and institutional levels, transforming artificial intelligence from a tool of alienation into an enabler of the “union of free people,” achieving a contemporary return to the philosophical spirit of Marx’s “changing the world”.
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