成本信息不对称与品牌竞争下的跨界竞合企业定价决策研究

Pricing Decisions in Cross-Industry Coopetition under Asymmetric Production Cost Information and Brand Competition

摘要: 本文首先考虑了由单一制造企业与单一数字企业和外部需求市场构成的跨界竞合联盟，基于Stackelberg博弈，考虑产品间的品牌竞争，系统分析生产成本信息对称与不对称情形下跨界竞合企业间的最优定价策略及其市场表现。研究表明：跨界竞合过程中，在制造企业掌握生产成本信息优势的前提下，其最优策略是夸大成本以提高批发价格，但当成本谎报值超过阈值时，将同时损害双方的利润，降低联盟整体效益；当品牌交叉价格敏感性增强时，即产品替代性上升，双方最优定价均呈上涨趋势，且替代产品间的销售价格变化趋势是一致的；无论生产成本信息对称与否，产品智能化程度及其市场效应对企业收益具有显著正向影响，而过高的智能化研发成本则会侵蚀利润。

Abstract: This study investigates a cross-industry coopetition alliance comprising a manufacturing enterprise, a digital firm, and an external consumer market. Employing a Stackelberg game framework and incorporating inter-brand competition, it systematically explores the optimal pricing strategies and market outcomes of the participating firms under both symmetric and asymmetric production cost information scenarios. The analysis reveals that when the manufacturing firm possesses an informational advantage regarding production costs, its optimal strategy is to strategically overstate costs in order to increase the wholesale price. However, once the level of cost misrepresentation surpasses a critical threshold, it adversely affects the profits of both parties and undermines the overall efficiency of the alliance. Moreover, as cross-price sensitivity between brands intensifies—indicating greater product substitutability—both firms tend to raise their optimal prices, and the pricing trajectories of competing products display a consistent upward trend. Regardless of the degree of cost information symmetry, the level of product intelligence and its associated market effects exert a significantly positive impact on firm profitability. Nevertheless, excessive investment in intelligent technology R&D may lead to diminishing returns by eroding profit margins.