电商平台算法用工主导权的规制路径研究
Research on Regulatory Pathways for Algorithmic Management in E-Commerce Platforms
摘要: 新业态劳动者规模越来越大,算法技术正以前所未有的深度嵌入电子商务平台用工的各个环节,逐渐成为重塑平台与从业者关系的关键力量。然而,面对电商平台在用工过程中日益强化的“算法支配式管理”,司法实践在劳动关系认定方面却陷入困境。现行基于“劳动者–雇主”二元结构的法律框架,已难以适应具备“经济依赖性”的平台从业者权益保障需求。本文以最高人民法院发布的相关政策文本为依据,揭示电商平台中看似“技术中立”的算法,实则承载着平台对劳动过程的深度控制——平台借助智能派单、用户评价与奖惩机制、数据闭环等手段,全面主导从业者的工作过程,却在法律责任认定中频繁规避雇主身份,导致大量电商平台从业者陷入“有责无权”的灰色地带。在规制路径上,可适当借鉴美国与欧盟经验,通过引入工会参与、建立算法备案制度、推动平台自我规制等方式加强算法治理,并尝试将反垄断法与劳动法协同运用,以更好地保障电子商务平台从业者的合法权益。
Abstract: The number of workers in new business sectors is growing rapidly. Algorithmic technology is being embedded into various aspects of employment within e-commerce platforms at an unprecedented depth, gradually becoming a key force reshaping the relationship between platforms and workers. However, faced with the increasingly reinforced “algorithm-driven management” by e-commerce platforms in the employment process, judicial practice faces difficulties in determining labor relationships. The current legal framework, based on the “worker-employer” binary structure, struggles to meet the needs of protecting the rights and interests of platform workers who exhibit “economic dependence”. Based on relevant policy texts issued by the Supreme People’s Court, this paper reveals that algorithms within e-commerce platforms, which appear “technologically neutral”, actually carry the platform’s deep control over the labor process. Platforms comprehensively dominate the work process of practitioners through means such as intelligent order dispatch, user ratings, reward and penalty mechanisms, and data closed-loops, yet frequently avoid employer status in legal liability determinations. This leads to a large number of e-commerce platform workers falling into a grey area of “accountability without corresponding rights”. Regarding regulatory pathways, experiences from the United States and the European Union can be appropriately referenced. Algorithm governance can be strengthened by introducing trade union participation, establishing algorithm filing systems, and promoting platform self-regulation. Furthermore, exploring the coordinated application of Antitrust Law and Labor Law can better protect the legitimate rights and interests of workers on e-commerce platforms.
文章引用:段清源. 电商平台算法用工主导权的规制路径研究[J]. 电子商务评论, 2025, 14(12): 2100-2109. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2025.14124090

参考文献

[1] 陆海娜, 陈以恒. 社会权利视角下的平台经济“第三类劳动者”保护[J]. 人权, 2020(1): 105-120.
[2] 李志锴. 组织行为视角下互联网平台劳动关系从属性展开的新进路[J]. 河北法学, 2022, 40(2): 98-115.
[3] 肖竹. 第三类劳动者的理论反思与替代路径[J]. 环球法律评论, 2018, 40(6): 79-100.
[4] 常凯, 郑小静. 雇佣关系还是合作关系?——互联网经济中用工关系性质辨析[J]. 中国人民大学学报, 2019, 33(2): 78-88.
[5] Vallas, S. and Schor, J.B. (2020) What Do Platforms Do? Understanding the Gig Economy. Annual Review of Sociology, 46, 273-294. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[6] 张江莉. 互联网平台竞争与反垄断规制以3Q反垄断诉讼为视角[J]. 中外法学, 2015, 27(1): 264-279.
[7] 陈兵. 因应超级平台对反垄断法规制的挑战[J]. 法学, 2020(2): 103-128.
[8] 孙晋. 数字平台垄断与数字竞争规则的建构[J]. 法律科学(西北政法大学学报), 2021, 39(4): 63-76.
[9] 孙益武. 论平台经济反垄断执法中的数据因素[J]. 法治研究, 2021(2): 115-126.
[10] 周围. 规制平台封禁行为的反垄断法分析——基于自我优待的视角[J]. 法学, 2022(7): 163-178.
[11] Rogers, B. (2016) Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics. Harvard Law & Policy Review, 10, 479-520.
[12] Dubal, V.B. (2021) Economic Security & the Regulation of Gig Work in California: From AB5 to Proposition 22. European Labour Law Journal, 13, 51-65. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[13] Daugareilh, I. (2019) The Legal Status of Platform Workers in France. Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 41, 405.
[14] 郑莉, 朱欣. 最大限度把新就业形态劳动者组织到工会中来[N]. 工人日报, 2022-11-29(001).
[15] Bessa, L., Joyce, S., Neumann, D., et al. (2022) A Global Analysis of Worker Protest in Digital Labour Platforms. International Labour Organization (ILO).
[16] Taylor, M., Marsh, G., Nicol, D., et al. (2017) Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 76.
[17] Schiek, D. and Gideon, A. (2018) Outsmarting the Gig-Economy through Collective Bargaining—EU Competition Law as a Barrier to Smart Cities? International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 32, 275-294. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef