道德规范性的整合主义进路

Integrativist Approach to Moral Normativity

摘要: 规范性作为当前哲学核心议题，其跨学科解释力贯穿伦理学、认识论等领域，但当前对道德规范性的研究存在三大核心问题：规范性事实存在吗？规范性事实与非规范性事实的关系是什么？规范性的本质是什么？科斯嘉德、帕菲特、达沃尔等著名学者的理论对这三个问题都有自己的回答，却难以兼容规范性的多重维度。因此可以借鉴一种整合主义进路，以“规范性判断”为核心，主张其兼具认知维度(关联事实的表征内容)与非认知维度(驱动行动的动机功能)，通过这两个维度的统一，道德规范性概念既有认知主义对事实属性的关注与自然主义的合理性，又兼容非认知主义的实践优势与非自然主义的独特性，最终为消解理论分歧、重构道德规范性的统一解释框架提供新思路。

Abstract: Normativity, as a core issue in contemporary philosophy, demonstrates interdisciplinary explanatory power that spans ethics, epistemology, and other fields. However, current research on moral normativity faces three fundamental questions: Do normative facts exist? What is the relationship between normative and non-normative facts? What is the nature of normativity? Eminent scholars such as Korsgaard, Parfit, and Darwall have proposed their own answers to these questions, yet their theories struggle to accommodate the multiple dimensions of normativity. Therefore, an integrationist approach can be adopted, centering on “normative judgment” and positing that it encompasses both a cognitive dimension (representational content related to facts) and a non-cognitive dimension (motivational function driving action). By unifying these two dimensions, the concept of moral normativity incorporates the cognitive focus on factual attributes and the reasonableness of naturalism, while also accommodating the practical advantages of non-cognitivism and the uniqueness of non-naturalism. Ultimately, this provides a new perspective for resolving theoretical disagreements and reconstructing a unified explanatory framework for moral normativity.