论人工智能机器人的法律主体资格
On the Legal Subject Qualification of Artificial Intelligence Robot
摘要: 随着科技的飞速发展，人工智能与人类的日常生活息息相关。人类在享受科技带来的方便的同时需要重新思考人工智能与人类的关系。关于哲学层面的主体定位于“自由意志”，但意志论在当今时代或许无法解释生成性人工智能的某些行为。因此应当采取功能主义进路，为人工智能赋予偏向工具型的、有限的、梯度式的法律主体资格，这种制度设计的实质是以人类中心主义为原则，但有限的法律人格包括不受人类恶意或非法利用的权利。除此之外，人工智能机器人在处理民事法律关系时享有有限的权利。在刑事责任的承担方面，人工智能需要被纳入一个系统的保险或者信托制度，用以保障受害者的权利和赔偿其损失。人工智能的军事化利用也需要国际社会的共同努力。
Abstract: With the rapid advancement of technology, artificial intelligence has become deeply intertwined with human daily life. While enjoying the convenience brought by technological progress, humanity must reconsider the relationship between AI and humans. Philosophically, the concept of “free will” remains central, yet modern theories of free will may struggle to explain certain behaviors of generative AI. Therefore, a functionalist approach should be adopted to grant AI limited, instrumental legal subject status. This institutional design fundamentally adheres to anthropocentrism, though the limited legal personality includes rights protected from malicious or illegal exploitation by humans. Additionally, AI robots should enjoy limited rights when handling civil legal matters. Regarding criminal liability, AI should be incorporated into systematic insurance or trust mechanisms to safeguard victims’ rights and compensate for losses. The militarization of AI also requires coordinated efforts from the international community.
文章引用：李爽. 论人工智能机器人的法律主体资格[J]. 社会科学前沿, 2025, 14(12): 274-280. https://doi.org/10.12677/ass.2025.14121090

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