电商平台就业模式下灵活就业群体的社会保障困境与政策优化

The Social Security Predicament and Policy Optimization of the Flexible Employment Group under the E-Commerce Platform Employment Model

摘要: 随着数字经济的快速发展，电商平台就业模式催生了规模庞大的灵活就业群体，同时也对传统社会保障体系提出了新的挑战。本文以“政策–市场–行为”三维分析框架为基础，系统探讨了电商平台灵活就业群体面临的社会保障困境及其政策成因，并提出在现行政策框架下的优化路径。研究发现，现行以标准劳动关系为核心的社会保障政策与平台就业的灵活性、去组织化特征之间存在结构性错配，具体表现为政策错配、平台风险外溢、个体参保能力弱化以及三方博弈困境。在政策层面，固定缴费机制与波动收入不匹配、职业伤害保障缺位、跨区域权益接续不畅等问题制约了灵活就业人员的参保意愿与能力；在市场层面，平台通过合同与算法设计将风险外溢至劳动者，形成“控制与责任分离”的治理逻辑；在行为层面，信息不对称、组织缺失与心理短视进一步削弱了个体的参保动力。本文提出以“激活存量、优化规则、明晰责任”为核心的政策优化路径，具体包括：建立弹性缴费机制以匹配收入波动，深化职业伤害保障试点并推动其制度化，明确平台的分层共担义务，创新数据治理与参保服务模式，构建多层次保障体系。这些建议旨在增强社会保障体系对灵活就业群体的包容性与适应性。

Abstract: With the rapid development of the digital economy, the employment model of e-commerce platforms has given rise to a large-scale flexible employment group, while also posing new challenges to the traditional social security system. Based on a three-dimensional analytical framework of “policy-market-behavior”, this paper systematically explores the social security predicament faced by the flexible employment group on e-commerce platforms and its policy causes, and proposes an optimization path under the current policy framework. The research finds that there is a structural mismatch between the current social security policy centered on standard labor relations and the flexibility and de-organization characteristics of platform employment, specifically manifested as policy mismatch, platform risk spillover, weakened individual participation ability, and a three-party game dilemma. At the policy level, problems such as the mismatch between the fixed contribution mechanism and fluctuating income, the absence of occupational injury protection, and the incoherence of cross-regional rights continuation have restricted the participation willingness and ability of flexible employees. At the market level, platforms shift risks to workers through contract and algorithm design, forming a governance logic of “separation of control and responsibility”. At the behavioral level, information asymmetry, organizational absence, and psychological short-sightedness further weaken individuals’ participation motivation. This paper proposes a policy optimization path centered on “activating the existing stock, optimizing rules, and clarifying responsibilities”, specifically including: establishing an elastic contribution mechanism to match income fluctuations, deepening the pilot of occupational injury protection and promoting its institutionalization, clarifying the hierarchical shared responsibility of platforms, innovating data governance and participation service models, and building a multi-level security system. These suggestions aim to enhance the inclusiveness and adaptability of the social security system to the flexible employment group.