言说的伦理：后期列维纳斯论语言和他者的关系

The Ethics of Saying: Levinas’ Later Thoughts on the Relation of Language and the Other

摘要: 现象学关于时间问题的探讨突出同时性显现，这意味着他者只有经由主体的同一才能获得表达。鉴于“所说”的同时性导致了语言之中无他者，同属现象学传统的列维纳斯批判现象学前辈的立场，突出“言说”对“所说”的超越。但他并不因此赞同结构–后结构主义脱离时间性来探讨语言自身的物性。在列维纳斯眼里，他者问题始终关涉人的精神和时间性，但他人只能在历时性的言说中而不是同时性的所说中通达。言说以踪迹的方式指向他人的面容，主体在其绝对被动性中给出为他的、能动的伦理。在物性的时代，我与他的伦理关联超越了物性语言的非人表达，并在当代哲学略显冷漠的异托邦中给出了人性的方案。

Abstract: Phenomenology’s discussion on time highlights the simultaneous manifestation, which implies that the Other can only be given through the identity of the subject. Given that the simultaneity of “Said” leads to the absence of the Other within language, Levinas, who belongs to the phenomenological tradition, criticizes the stance of his predecessors, emphasizing the transcendence of “Saying” over “Said”. However, he does not thereby agree with the structuralism and post-structuralism approach of discussing the materiality of language independently of temporality. In Levinas’ view, the issue of the other is always related to human spirit and temporality, although the Other can only be reached through diachronic Saying rather than simultaneous Said. Saying points to the face of the other in “Trace”, and the subject, in its absolute passivity, offers a for-the-Other, active ethics. In the age of materiality, the ethical connection between I and the Other transcends the inhuman expression of material language and offers a humanistic solution to the contemporary heterotopia.