绿色补贴政策下双渠道供应链渠道选择与信息共享策略研究

Study on Channel Choice and Information Sharing Strategy in a Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain under Government Subsidy Policies

摘要: 在绿色消费趋势与政策支持的双重影响下，制造商通过建立绿色供应链体系，实现了经济效益与环境绩效的协同提升。本文构建了一个由单一制造商与零售商组成的双渠道供应链模型，探讨在政府提供绿色补贴的情况下，制造商的销售渠道决策以及零售商的信息共享策略。模型考虑零售商拥有私有市场需求信息，而制造商同时面临环保投资与渠道建设成本的不确定性，据此设定四种策略组合(NN、NE、SN、SE)，系统分析绿色补贴系数、环保投资效率及渠道竞争强度等关键变量对供应链成员最优策略与利润的影响。研究发现，绿色补贴有助于降低制造商的绿色投入门槛，并促使其更倾向于采用双渠道结构；在高环保技术效率条件下，信息共享能够实现供应链双方的互利共赢；此外，适度的渠道入侵成本可能激励零售商主动共享信息，从而提升制造商的利润水平。本研究为政府制定绿色补贴政策及企业间协同合作机制提供了理论依据。

Abstract: Under the dual influence of the growing green consumption trend and supportive environmental policies, manufacturers can achieve the simultaneous improvement of economic performance and environmental outcomes by establishing green supply chain systems. This paper develops a dual-channel supply chain model consisting of a single manufacturer and a retailer to investigate the manufacturer’s channel selection decisions and the retailer’s information-sharing strategy in the presence of government-provided green subsidies. The model assumes that the retailer possesses private market demand information, while the manufacturer faces uncertainty related to environmental investment and channel establishment costs. Based on these assumptions, four strategic scenarios are examined: single-channel sales without information sharing, dual-channel sales without information sharing, single-channel sales with information sharing, and dual-channel sales with information sharing. The impacts of key factors—namely the green subsidy rate, environmental investment efficiency, and channel competition intensity—on the optimal strategies and profits of supply chain members are systematically analyzed. The results indicate that green subsidies help lower the threshold for manufacturers’ green investments and increase their incentives to adopt a dual-channel structure. When environmental technology efficiency is sufficiently high, information sharing leads to a win–win outcome for both parties. Moreover, a moderate level of channel encroachment cost may motivate the retailer to voluntarily share information, thereby enhancing the manufacturer’s profit. This study provides theoretical insights for governments in designing green subsidy policies and for firms in developing cooperative mechanisms within green supply chains.