电商平台制造商生态标签“漂绿”的治理路径——基于平台自治与外部监管视角
Governance Path for Ecological Labeling “Greenwashing” of E-Commerce Platform Manufacturers—Based on Platform Autonomy and External Regulatory Perspectives
摘要: 随着电商发展,平台生态标签已经成为制造商主动披露ESG信息的工具。然而,由于政府监管缺失,电商平台审核不足、消费者投诉无效等,导致平台生态标签情境下“漂绿”问题频发。因此,本文认为,平台宽松监管策略下会加速“漂绿”行为的扩散,导致制造商“漂绿”行为频发。基于此,引入消费者反馈,构建平台制造商–平台–政府之间的三方演化博弈模型,并通过仿真分析探讨了不同因素对系统演化结果的影响。研究发现:随着选择“绿色生产”策略的平台制造商初始比例的不断增加,系统逐渐演化至“绿色生产”的期望方向;消费者好评或差评等反馈行为对平台制造商的行为起到约束作用;政府对平台和制造商的严格处罚,对两者的不良行为存在约束作用,另外当平台选择严格监管策略时,平台对平台制造商采取适当的奖惩措施,系统越有可能演化至“绿色生产”的理想状态。最后,对促进平台生态标签情境下制造商“漂绿”行为治理提出相关对策建议。
Abstract: With the development of e-commerce, platform ecological labels have become a tool for manufacturers to proactively disclose ESG information. However, due to the lack of government regulation, insufficient review of e-commerce platforms, and ineffective consumer complaints, the problem of “greenwashing” frequently occurs in the context of platform ecological labels. Therefore, this article believes that under the loose regulatory strategy of platforms, the spread of “greenwashing” behavior will be accelerated, leading to frequent “greenwashing” behavior by manufacturers. Based on this, consumer feedback is introduced to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model among platform manufacturer, platform and government, and the impact of different factors on the system evolution results is explored through simulation analysis. Research has found that as the initial proportion of platform manufacturers choosing the “green production” strategy continues to increase, the system gradually evolves towards the expected direction of “green production”; consumer complaints and feedback such as positive or negative reviews have a restraining effect on the behavior of platform manufacturers; the strict punishment imposed by the government on platforms and manufacturers has a restraining effect on their misconduct. In addition, when platforms choose strict regulatory strategies and take appropriate reward and punishment measures against platform manufacturers, the system is more likely to evolve into an ideal state of “green production”. Finally, relevant countermeasures and suggestions are proposed for the governance of manufacturers' “greenwashing” behavior in the context of promoting platform ecological labeling.
文章引用:邓冉冉. 电商平台制造商生态标签“漂绿”的治理路径——基于平台自治与外部监管视角[J]. 电子商务评论, 2025, 14(12): 5196-5212. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2025.14124478

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