超逾存在的善良——论列维纳斯欲望概念中的伦理维度

Goodness beyond Being—On the Ethical Dimension in Levinas’s Conception of Desire

摘要: 欲望(désir)承自笛卡尔对激情的分析，在二十世纪法国哲学重焕活力。同一时代的萨特、拉康、列维纳斯从各自的理论背景出发对欲望做出新的理解。饱受二战残害的列维纳斯，面对海德格尔存在论的总体化倾向，提出伦理学作为第一哲学的主张。欲望则成为他突破总体主义的关键概念。他将欲望的产生和存在的发生联系起来——把欲望理解为善良。欲望是对他人的欲望，它朝向他人的面容，并由此度量着他人之无限。本质上，欲望是不安意识为了回应他人而生发的情态，它是自我对幸福的牺牲、对他人责任的承担。借由欲望即善良这一通路，列维纳斯试图展示一种别样的存在，即以善良为其本性的伦理存在。这种存在构成了对海德格尔“此在”的超逾，并开启了一个伦理维度的世界。

Abstract: Desire (désir), inherited from Descartes’ analysis of the passions, experienced a revival in twentieth-century French philosophy. Philosophier of the same era such as Sartre, Lacan, and Levinas offered new interpretations of desire from their respective theoretical backgrounds. Levinas, deeply scarred by the devastation of World War II and confronting the totalizing tendency of Heidegger’s ontology, proposed ethics as first philosophy. Desire thus became the key concept through which he sought to break through totalitarianism. He linked the emergence of desire to the event of being—seeing desire as Goodness. Desire is the desire for the Other; it is oriented toward the face, and in this way, measures the infinity of the Other. Essentially, desire is a modality arising from the “Mauvaise conscience” in response to the Other. It signifies the self’s sacrifice of its own happiness and its assumption of responsibility for the Other. Through the pathway of Desire-as-Goodness, Levinas attempts to reveal a different mode of being: an ethical being whose very nature is goodness. This mode of being forms a transcendence of Heidegger’s “Dasein” and opens a world of ethical dimension.