退货保证下企业诱导学习的产品线引入与定价研究
Research on the Introduction and Pricing of Product Lines for Enterprise Induced Learning under Money Back Guarantee
DOI: 10.12677/mse.2026.151021, PDF,    科研立项经费支持
作者: 冯 倩, 周建亨*:东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海;桂昌厚, 项旭东:用友汽车信息科技(上海)股份有限公司,上海
关键词: 退货保证诱导学习产品线管理工程Money Back Guarantee Induced Learning Product Lines Management Science and Engineering
摘要: 本文基于退货保证背景,立足管理工程视角,构建了包含消费者异质性和学习成本的理论模型,系统研究了企业诱导学习与产品线设计的联合优化决策问题,为管理科学与工程领域的企业运营决策提供理论支撑。本文采用Stackelberg博弈框架,设定市场中存在单一企业,可选择提供单一产品或双产品线,并结合是否进行诱导学习划分四种决策模式。针对四种模式确定企业可能的定价策略,并进行各策略之间的收益对比分析。消费者分为高类型与低类型,购买前仅知晓产品价值均值,购买或参与诱导学习后明确真实价值。研究结果表明,企业策略因产品线引入与否呈现不同特征。未引入产品线时,其最优策略分三阶段:低类型消费者感知系数小时,企业采用高价精选策略;感知系数中等时,转向均价覆盖策略;感知系数大时,实施低价全服务策略。在引入产品线场景中,当产品线引入成本系数超过临界值时,企业才更有动力通过诱导学习优化收益,此临界值与低类型消费者的感知系数、退货成本与诱导学习成本系数有关。
Abstract: Based on the background of return guarantees, this paper constructs a theoretical model incorporating consumer heterogeneity and learning costs from the perspective of management science and engineering, systematically investigating the joint optimization decision-making problem of enterprises’ induced learning and product line design, and providing theoretical support for enterprise operation decisions in the field of management science and engineering. Adopting a Stackelberg game framework, this study assumes a single enterprise in the market that can choose to offer a single product or a dual product line. Four decision-making modes are divided based on whether induced learning is implemented or not. For the four modes, the possible pricing strategies of the enterprise are identified, and a comparative analysis of profits among various strategies is conducted. Consumers are categorized into high-type and low-type. Before purchase, they only know the average value of the product and clarify the true value after purchase or participation in induced learning. The research results show that enterprise strategies exhibit different characteristics depending on whether a product line is introduced or not. When no product line is introduced, the optimal strategy of the enterprise is divided into three stages: when the perception coefficient of low-type consumers is small, the enterprise adopts a high-price selection strategy; when the perception coefficient is at a medium level, it shifts to an average-price coverage strategy; when the perception coefficient is large, it implements a low-price full-service strategy. In the scenario of introducing a product line, the enterprise is more motivated to optimize profits through induced learning only when the product line introduction cost coefficient exceeds a critical value. This critical value is related to the perception coefficient of low-type consumers, return costs, and the induced learning cost coefficient.
文章引用:冯倩, 周建亨, 桂昌厚, 项旭东. 退货保证下企业诱导学习的产品线引入与定价研究[J]. 管理科学与工程, 2026, 15(1): 206-219. https://doi.org/10.12677/mse.2026.151021

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