薪酬激励动态性、营销战略风格与企业绩效

Compensation Incentive Dynamics, Marketing Strategy Style and Enterprise Performance

摘要: 人力资本已成为经济增长的核心战略资本，说明公司治理必须围绕人力资本及其动态性展开。本文从人力资本理论和委托代理理论出发，以中国上市公司为研究样本，实证检验高管薪酬激励动态性对营销战略风格的影响，及营销战略风格对企业绩效的作用。结果表明：高管薪酬激励动态性越显著，企业营销战略越趋于稳健；激进的营销战略虽有助于促进营业收入增长，却会显著损害企业的盈利水平，不利于企业的持续发展。本文从人力资本动态性角度，研究了高管薪酬激励动态性对公司营销战略风格的影响，揭示了营销战略风格与企业绩效之间的关联。本文丰富了动态激励相容理论并给出了可靠的经验证据，有助于从动态性的角度优化高管薪酬激励机制设计，有效应对人力资本的动态性。

Abstract: Human capital has become the core strategic capital for economic growth, which implies that corporate governance must revolve around human capital and its dynamics. Starting from the human capital theory and principal-agent theory, this paper takes Chinese listed companies as the research sample to empirically examine the impact of the dynamics of executive compensation incentives on marketing strategy style, as well as the effect of marketing strategy style on corporate performance. The results show that the more prominent the dynamics of executive compensation incentives are, the more prudent a firm’s marketing strategy tends to be; although aggressive marketing strategies help promote the growth of operating income, they significantly impair the firm’s profitability and are not conducive to its sustainable development. From the perspective of human capital dynamics, this paper studies the impact of the dynamics of executive compensation incentives on a firm’s marketing strategy style and reveals the relationship between marketing strategy style and corporate performance. This paper enriches the theory of dynamic incentive compatibility and provides reliable empirical evidence, which is helpful for optimizing the design of executive compensation incentive mechanisms from the perspective of dynamics and effectively addressing the dynamics of human capital.