社交电商平台“数据霸凌”的反思与规制
Reflection and Regulation of “Data Bullying” by Social E-Commerce Platforms
摘要: 社交电商平台在数据要素创造、采集、加工与使用过程中形成的权力压迫行为可定义为“数据霸凌”,其实质是平台凭借结构性优势地位,持续侵蚀用户数据权利的实践行为。文章从权力结构非对称性、行为强制性与损害实质性三个层面界定“数据霸凌”,并列举了强制数据捆绑授权及其退出机制缺失、价值认知偏差下的数据要素收益分配不公、算法定价下的数据杀熟等典型表现。在此基础上,研究聚焦于权力制衡,提出了以用户权利为本位的规制路径:遵守“最小必要原则”,推行“个人数据选择退出机制”、构建基于数据课税的收益再分配机制、建立第三方算法审计与信誉约束机制,为构建兼顾数字经济发展与个体权利保障的数据治理范式提供了理论参考与实践指导。
Abstract: The oppressive power dynamics exercised by social e-commerce platforms during the creation, collection, processing, and utilization of data elements can be defined as “data bullying”. In essence, this refers to the practice where platforms leverage their structural advantages to continuously erode user data rights. This paper delimits “data bullying” across three dimensions: the asymmetry of power structures, the coerciveness of conduct, and the substantive nature of the resulting harm. It further identifies typical manifestations of this phenomenon, including forced bundled data authorization with a lack of exit mechanisms, unfair distribution of returns on data elements due to biased value perception, and algorithmic price discrimination. Building on this analysis, the study focuses on power checks and balances, proposing a regulatory path centered on user rights. This includes adhering to the “principle of minimum necessity”, implementing a “personal data opt-out mechanism”, constructing a revenue redistribution system based on data taxation, and establishing third-party algorithmic auditing and reputation constraint mechanisms. Ultimately, this research provides theoretical references and practical guidance for establishing a data governance paradigm that balances the development of the digital economy with the protection of individual rights.
文章引用:汪永超, 侯婷, 李想. 社交电商平台“数据霸凌”的反思与规制[J]. 电子商务评论, 2026, 15(2): 154-160. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2026.152140

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