电商平台“仅退款”对商家和消费者的双向影响研究

Research on the Bidirectional Impact of “Refund Only” on Merchants and Consumers in E-Commerce Platforms

摘要: “仅退款”模式已成为我国主流电商平台的标配售后规则，但其对商家和消费者的双向影响尚缺乏系统研究。本文以电商平台“仅退款”模式为研究对象，分析该模式对消费者、商家及平台生态的双向影响，结合《民法典》《电子商务法》和《消费者权益保护法》探讨平台扣款行为的合法性边界。研究发现：该模式在降低消费者维权成本的同时滋生了道德风险，在倒逼商家提升品质的同时加剧了中小商家的经营压力；现行模式存在界定标准模糊、责任分担失衡、恶意行为惩戒不足、法律边界不清晰等问题。据此，本文提出构建多方共治的平衡机制，包括完善模式细则、构建机器学习风险识别指标体系、建立信用分级制度、强化恶意行为惩戒及探索成本分摊新模式等建议，以实现消费者权益保护与商家合法利益的动态平衡。

Abstract: The “refund only” model has become a standard after-sales rule for mainstream e-commerce platforms in China, yet its bidirectional impact on merchants and consumers lacks systematic study. This paper analyzes the dual effects of this model on consumers, merchants, and platform ecosystems, and examines the legal boundaries of platform deduction behavior under the Civil Code, the E-commerce Law, and the Consumer Rights Protection Law. The study finds that while the model reduces consumer rights protection costs, it breeds moral hazard; while it pressures merchants to improve quality, it intensifies operational difficulties for small and medium-sized merchants. The current model suffers from ambiguous definition standards, imbalanced responsibility-sharing mechanisms, insufficient punishment for malicious behavior, and unclear legal boundaries. Accordingly, this paper proposes a balanced multi-party governance mechanism, including improving policy details, constructing a machine learning risk identification index system, establishing a credit grading system, strengthening punishment for malicious behavior, and exploring new cost-sharing models, to achieve a dynamic balance between consumer rights protection and merchants’ legitimate interests.