基于农业保险的农产品电商供应链决策研究

Research on Agricultural Product E-Commerce Supply Chain Decision-Making under Agricultural Insurance

摘要: 农业生产面临的自然风险对农产品电子商务供应链稳定性构成挑战。本文以农户与电商平台构成的两级供应链为研究对象，构建电商平台提供与不提供保费补贴两种决策模型，运用博弈论分析农户最优投入量与电商平台最优收购价格，探讨自然风险概率、保费补贴及赔付率对供应链成员决策与利润的影响。研究表明，无补贴情景下，农户承担主要保险成本，平台通过价格进行调节；补贴情景下，平台通过“保费补贴 + 收购价格折扣”重构激励机制，能够提升农户投入水平并改善双方收益；敏感性分析进一步揭示，保费补贴比例与收购价格折扣比例是补贴机制有效运行的基础参数，且当二者处于合理配置区间时，平台由保费补贴行为所带来的声誉收益，将进一步强化补贴机制对供应链绩效的提升作用。

Abstract: The natural risks facing agricultural production pose a challenge to the stability of the agricultural e-commerce supply chain. This study examines a two-tier supply chain comprising farmers and e-commerce platforms. It constructs two decision-making models—one where the e-commerce platform provides premium subsidies and another where it does not—and employs game theory to analyze the optimal input levels for farmers and the optimal purchase prices for e-commerce platforms. The study explores the impact of natural risk probability, premium subsidies, and claim ratios on the decisions and profits of supply chain members. The findings indicate that in the no-subsidy scenario, farmers bear the primary insurance costs, while the platform adjusts through pricing; in the subsidized scenario, the platform restructures the incentive mechanism through a combination of “premium subsidies and purchase price discounts”, which can increase farmers’ input levels and improve returns for both parties; sensitivity analysis further reveals that the ratio of premium subsidies and the ratio of purchase price discounts are fundamental parameters for the effective operation of the subsidy mechanism. Furthermore, when these two ratios fall within a reasonable range, the reputational benefits gained by the platform from providing premium subsidies will further enhance the mechanism’s role in improving supply chain performance.