声誉机制、反垄断规制与平台企业创新策略选择——基于动态信号博弈模型的分析
Reputation Mechanisms, Antitrust Regulations, and Platform Firms’ Innovation Strategy Choices—An Analysis Based on a Dynamic Signaling Game Model
摘要: 平台经济常态化监管背景下,反垄断执法与舆论监督如何共同影响平台企业创新策略选择,是关乎数字经济高质量发展的重要议题。现有研究多停留在特征事实归纳或政策影响的定性分析,缺乏对内在传导机制的理论阐释。本文基于声誉机制构建了一个两阶段动态信号博弈模型,系统考察了平台企业在反垄断政策与舆论压力下,于“创新”与“滥用市场地位”之间的战略权衡。研究结果表明:反垄断处罚显著促进了平台企业创新;舆论监督具有“杠杆放大”效应,能通过提高违规曝光概率与反垄断执法形成互补;声誉机制是外部规制转化为内部创新动力的关键渠道,且在高声誉敏感度的平台企业中效应更为显著。据此,本文提出构建“行政处罚 + 舆论曝光”组合式监管体系、完善信用分级监管机制等政策建议,为推动平台经济创新发展提供理论依据。
Abstract: Under the context of normalized regulation of the platform economy, how antitrust enforcement and public opinion supervision jointly influence the innovation strategy choices of platform enterprises is an important issue concerning the high-quality development of the digital economy. Existing research largely remains at the stage of characterizing facts or qualitative analysis of policy impacts, lacking theoretical explanation of the underlying transmission mechanisms. This paper constructs a two-stage dynamic signaling game model based on a reputation mechanism to systematically examine the strategic trade-off of platform enterprises between “innovation” and “abuse of market dominance” under antitrust policies and public opinion pressure. The research results indicate that antitrust penalties significantly promote platform enterprise innovation; public opinion supervision has a “leverage amplification” effect, which can form a complementarity with antitrust enforcement by increasing the probability of exposure of violations; the reputation mechanism is a key channel through which external regulation is transformed into internal innovation incentives, and the effect is more pronounced in platform enterprises with high reputation sensitivity. Accordingly, this paper proposes policy recommendations such as building a combined regulatory system of “administrative penalties and public exposure” and improving a credit-based regulatory mechanism, providing a theoretical basis for promoting innovative development in the platform economy.
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