电商平台“二选一”行为的反垄断规制困境与出路
The Dilemma and Solutions for Antitrust Regulation of “Either-Or Choice” on E-Commerce Platforms
摘要: 电商平台“二选一”行为是平台经济反垄断规制的焦点问题,传统反垄断分析框架在应对平台经济新特征时面临系统性困境。本文采用案例分析的方法,以阿里巴巴案、京东诉天猫案为实证样本,系统梳理《反垄断法》《电子商务法》《反不正当竞争法》之间的适用关系。研究发现,规制困境体现为三重结构性难题,即相关市场界定因双边市场特性而方法失灵,SSNIP测试法在零价市场中近乎失效;市场支配地位认定中市场份额指示作用弱化,新型因素考量缺乏统一标准;多元法律规范之间适用竞合,“正当理由”抗辩标准模糊。同时,对“二选一”行为的违法性判断还需审慎考量其潜在效率抗辩,只有在排除其具有促进竞争、提升效率等正当理由后,才能最终认定其违法性。破解上述困境需要从相关市场界定方法优化、市场支配地位认定标准完善、法律适用协同以及构建精细化的效率抗辩分析框架四个维度进行制度调适,形成事前合规指引与事后司法救济协同的规制体系。
Abstract: The “either-or choice” practices of e-commerce platforms are a focal point of antitrust regulation in the platform economy, and traditional antitrust analytical frameworks face systemic challenges when addressing the new characteristics of the platform economy. This paper employs a case study approach, using the Alibaba case and the JD.com v. Tmall case as empirical samples, to systematically examine the interrelationships among the “Anti-Monopoly Law”, the “E-Commerce Law”, and the “Anti-Unfair Competition Law”. The study finds that regulatory challenges manifest as three structural difficulties: first, the definition of the relevant market fails due to the characteristics of two-sided markets, rendering the SSNIP test nearly ineffective in zero-sum markets; the indicative role of market share in determining market dominance has weakened, and there is a lack of unified standards for considering new factors; there is a conflict of application among diverse legal norms, and the standard for the “justifiable grounds” defense remains ambiguous. At the same time, when assessing the illegality of “either-or choice” practices, one must carefully consider potential efficiency defenses; only after ruling out justifiable grounds such as promoting competition or enhancing efficiency can the illegality be definitively established. To resolve these challenges, institutional adjustments must be made across four dimensions: optimizing methods for defining relevant markets, refining standards for determining market dominance, ensuring the coordinated application of laws, and establishing a refined analytical framework for the efficiency defense. This will create a regulatory system that integrates ex ante compliance guidance with ex post judicial remedies.
文章引用:孟瑶. 电商平台“二选一”行为的反垄断规制困境与出路[J]. 电子商务评论, 2026, 15(5): 932-939. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2026.155595

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