创业企业家选择投资者的博弈策略分析

Game Strategy Analysis of Entrepreneur Choosing Investors

摘要: 创业投资过程中，创业企业家期望选择对自己最有优势的投资者，然而选择的过程及合作的过程往往伴随双重道德风险。通过构建创业企业家与创业投资家或天使投资人的博弈收益模型，运用贝叶斯法则计算后验概率，引入创业企业家与天使投资家的共同认知度，以及各方所付出的努力水平对每一方以及整体的项目利润的影响，得出不同情形下创业企业家选择投资合作伙伴的策略。创业企业家在选择合作伙伴时，除受资金规模影响外还有可能会考虑行为因素，当认同感给创业企业家带来更高价值时，创业企业家会选择天使投资人进行合作。创业企业家与天使投资人具有高认同情形下，创业企业家与VC间协同效应系数越大，创业企业家越倾向于与VC合作；反之，创业企业家与VC间协同效应系数越小，创业企业家越倾向于与天使投资人A合作。

Abstract: During the process of venture capital investment, entrepreneurs expect to choose the investors who have the most advantage for themselves. However, double moral hazard often occurs in this process. By building the income game model of the entrepreneur and its investment partner—venture capitalists or angel investors, we research the synergy effect between the entrepreneur and its cooperative venture capitalist and the common recognition of the entrepreneur and its cooperative angel investor. Besides, we study the impact of effort level from all parties on each party’s profit and the overall project’s. Finally, we acquire the optimal strategy for choosing investment partners in different situations. Besides the size of fund, the entrepreneur choosing partners are also affected by behavioral factors. When the common recognition brings higher value, the entrepreneur will choose angel investors to cooperate. Considering high common recognition between entrepreneur and angel investors, the greater the synergy coefficient between entrepreneur and VC, the more likely the startup tends to cooperate with VC. Otherwise, the entrepreneur becomes more inclined to cooperate with angel investors.