制度环境、环保约谈与企业环保投入
Institutional Environment, Environmental Protection Talks and Corporate Environmental Investment
摘要: 本文采用2011~2018年发生环保约谈城市和上市公司数据，运用双重差分方法，从企业环保投入视角来考察环保约谈的微观效果及地区制度环境异质性的影响。研究发现：环保约谈促进了当地企业的环保投入水平，且这种正向影响在国有企业中更为显著，此结论在多种稳健性检验后依然成立。进一步研究发现，在法制环境较好、市场化水平较高以及经济发展程度较高的地区企业中，环保约谈对企业环保投入的正向影响更显著。本文研究丰富了环保约谈在微观企业层面效果的相关研究，为政府进一步完善环保约谈制度提供决策参考。
Abstract: Based on the panel the data of cities and listed companies where environmental protection inter-views took place from 2011 to 2018; this paper empirically examine the microcosmic effect of en-vironmental protection interview from the angle of enterprise environmental investment and the moderating effect of regional institutional environment through difference-in-differences method. The results show that cities where environmental protection interviews take place, the level of environmental protection investment of listed companies is higher, and this positive influence is more significant in state-owned enterprises. The above logic has been corroborated and strengthened after a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, in the regional enterprises with better legal environment, higher degree of marketization and higher level of economic development, the environmental protection interview has a more significant positive impact on the environmental protection investment of enterprises. This study enriches the relevant research on the economic consequences of environmental protection interview and also provides reference for the government to optimize the environmental protection interview system.
文章引用：王静, 聂军. 制度环境、环保约谈与企业环保投入[J]. 环境保护前沿, 2020, 10(5): 679-692. https://doi.org/10.12677/AEP.2020.105084

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