基于三方博弈的乡村企业人才引入模型及策略分析

Talent Introduction Model and Strategy Analysis of Rural Enterprises Based on Tripartite Game

摘要: 针对当前乡村企业发展存在的人才引入困难问题，本文基于演化博弈的视角，建立了地方政府、乡村企业及优秀人才的三方博弈模型，并在不同的约束条件下对模型的演化稳定策略进行了研究和分析。结果表明，地方政府主动扶持，乡村企业大力引入，优秀人才乡企就业是所期望达到的一种最理想的演化状态。这种稳定状态的产生主要受地方政府扶持成本、乡村企业大力引入时获得的效益增量、优秀人才乡企就业的薪酬等因素的影响，本文进一步通过数值仿真直观地展示了部分参数变化下各参与方的策略选择和演化路径，并从不同的角度提出了能够促进乡村企业人才引进的建议。

Abstract: Aimed at the difficulty of talent introduction in the development of rural enterprises, this paper establishes a tripartite game model of local government, rural enterprises and excellent talents from the perspective of evolutionary game, and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of the model under different constraints. The results show that local governments actively support, rural enterprises vigorously introduce, and excellent talents work in countryside are expected to achieve the most ideal evolution state. This kind of stable state is mainly influenced by the support cost of local government, the benefit increment obtained by introducing rural enterprises vigorously, and the salary of excellent talents employed by rural enterprises. Furthermore, the strategy selection and evolution path of each participant under the change of some parameters are shown by numerical simulation. Finally, the paper proposes some suggestions on how to promote the enterprises to participate in the evolution of rural areas.