高管股权激励对财务舞弊的影响——来自我国上市公司的证据

The Impact of Executive Equity Incentives on Financial Fraud—The Evidence from Listed Companies in Our Country

摘要: 本文选取2015~2019年我国沪深两市部分A股上市公司为样本，探究上市公司实施高管股权激励计划对公司财务舞弊倾向的影响。通过建立回归模型，运用Stata16.0进行回归模型验证分析。研究结果表明，实施高管股权激励计划和上市公司财务舞弊倾向为负相关关系，且实施限制性股票激励比实施股票期权激励对公司的财务舞弊倾向更大。

Abstract: This paper selects some A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2019 as a sample to explore the impact of the implementation of executive equity incentive plans on the company’s financial fraud tendency. By establishing the regression model, Stata16.0 was used to verify and analyze the regression model. The results show that the implementation of executive equity incentive plans and the financial fraud tendency of listed companies are negatively correlated, and the implementation of restricted stock incentive has a greater tendency to financial fraud of companies than the implementation of stock option incentives.